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Sunoco Logistics Partners Flash Fire

Overview

On August 12, 2016, seven workers were injured, three critically, when a flash fire and explosion occurred during hot work activities at the Sunoco Nederland crude oil terminal in Nederland, Texas. The CSB final report states that the incident occurred while a contractor was welding a piping segment. The probable cause was Sunoco approving, and L-Con conducting, hot work on equipment that contained an explosive atmosphere.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company Sunoco Logistics Partners L.P. / Sunoco Partners Marketing and Terminals (SPMT) Nederland Terminal
Location Nederland, TX
Incident Date 08/12/2016
Investigation Status The CSB released its final report via a news release on September 28, 2022
Accident Type Hot Work - Explosion and Fire
Final Report Release Date 09/28/2022

What Happened

  • In April 2016, Sunoco’s Nederland terminal began construction on the installation of new aboveground storage tanks, associated piping, and modifications to existing piping to facilitate transfer of crude oil to and from tanks within the terminal.
  • Sunoco hired L-Con, Inc. to complete the piping modifications, including proper fit and alignment, pipe cutting, and welding.
  • L-Con subcontracted CARBER to cut and isolate piping segments.
  • On August 11, 2016, CARBER cut and isolated a 30-inch-diameter piping section using company-specific isolation tools. The pipe contained residual crude oil.
  • On August 12, 2016, L-Con conducted a Job Hazard Analysis (JHA).
  • A CIS employee, on behalf of Sunoco, issued a hot work permit to L-Con permitting welding to start.
  • During the day shift on August 12, 2016, L-Con contractors began arc welding flanges onto the piping.
  • After approximately three to four inches of welding the inside surface of the flange, vapor inside the piping between two installed CARBER isolation tools ignited.
  • The ignition initiated a pressure spike that caused the isolation tools at flanges A and B to blow out of the open pipe at the north and south ends.
  • The forced ejection of the isolation tools and the flash fire from the pipe section injured seven contractors.
  • L-Con and CIS employees called 911 at approximately 8:40 p.m. CST and dispatched emergency responders.

Facility and Process Context

  • The Sunoco Partners Marketing and Terminals (SPMT) Nederland Terminal is located on the Sabine-Neches waterway between Beaumont and Port Arthur, Texas.
  • The terminal provides storage and distribution services for refiners and other large transporters of crude oil, butane, and propane.
  • The terminal receives by pipeline, vessel, rail, and truck, stores, and distributes by pipeline and vessel crude oil, butane, and propane.
  • The terminal has over 70 aboveground storage tanks dedicated to crude oil.
  • The Central Manifold is used to provide connections from pipelines to aboveground storage tanks within the terminal and to transport oil between tanks in that region of the terminal.
  • The terminal is in a primarily industrial area but is within approximately 0.5 miles of a residential area.

Consequences

  • Fatalities: 0
  • Injuries: 7 workers
  • Environmental release: The flash fire and explosion were localized and had no impact offsite nor widespread impact to the site other than the immediate area of the incident.
  • Facility damage: black soot on the side of the building where the crude oil and flash fire impacted the building
  • Operational impact: The incident occurred during ongoing welding at the terminal.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • Sunoco approving and L-Con conducting hot work activities on equipment that contained an explosive atmosphere that, when exposed to an ignition source, resulted in an explosion event.

Contributing Factors

  • The piping section was not cleared of flammable material nor inerted prior to conducting hot work (welding).
  • The weather at the time of the incident contributed to the existence of flammable vapors inside the pipe.
  • The vapor/air mixture inside the pipe was flammable.
  • The atmosphere inside the pipe at the time of the incident was explosive due to confinement of the flammable atmosphere by the CARBER isolation tools and ignition when exposed to an ignition source.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • Ineffective implementation and execution of policies and procedures by Sunoco, L-Con, and CARBER.
  • Sunoco’s Hot Work procedure did not adequately state that hot work on equipment that contained or previously contained flammable material was not permitted by OSHA or NFPA 51B, nor did it clearly explain how to ensure equipment shall be cleaned or decontaminated to safely conduct hot work.
  • Sunoco did not take measures to decontaminate the equipment prior to conducting hot work.
  • Sunoco’s decision was not to decontaminate the pipe, but to isolate the flammable material inside by using the CARBER isolation tools.

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • The piping section was not cleared of flammable material nor inerted prior to conducting hot work (welding).
  • Sunoco’s Hot Work procedure required that equipment that has been in flammable or combustible service or may be contaminated with hazardous materials shall be purged, made safe, or decontaminated prior to conducting hot work on the equipment.
  • Sunoco’s Hot Work procedure stated that piping, storage tanks, or associated equipment that have contained flammable or combustible materials shall be properly isolated and decontaminated (by purging or flushing) prior to approval of any hot work activity on the equipment.
  • Sunoco’s Hot Work procedure stated that in situations where piping systems or other process equipment cannot be isolated or fully decontaminated, alternative precautions, such as purging with inert gases, must be established to ensure that welding and cutting can be conducted safely.
  • L-Con’s Welding and Cutting Safety procedure stated that a JHA shall be used to identify and communicate the potential hazards and required safety controls associated with all welding and cutting operations.
  • The issued hot work permit required a fire watch, fire extinguisher, and a continuous flammable gas monitor for the job.
  • According to the work permit issued the night of the incident, atmospheric testing was conducted at 7:00 p.m. and did not detect any flammable vapors.
  • There were no accounts from the welders that the continuous monitor alarmed at any time during welding activities.

Recommendations

  • None listed in the source material.

Key Engineering Lessons

  • Hot work should not be approved on equipment that contains or may contain an explosive atmosphere.
  • Equipment that has been in flammable or combustible service should be purged, made safe, or decontaminated before hot work is performed.
  • If piping systems or other process equipment cannot be isolated or fully decontaminated, alternative precautions such as purging with inert gases must be established before welding or cutting.
  • Isolation of residual flammable material inside piping is not an adequate substitute for decontamination when hot work is planned.

Source Notes

  • Priority 1 final report used as the authoritative source for incident narrative, causes, consequences, and findings.
  • Priority 4 release schedule only confirmed the incident name, location, date, and anticipated publication timeframe; it did not add incident details.
  • Facility company name consolidated from source terminology: Sunoco Logistics Partners L.P. and Sunoco Partners Marketing and Terminals (SPMT) Nederland Terminal.

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