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Partridge Raleigh Oilfield Explosion and Fire

Overview

Three contractor workers died and one contractor suffered serious injuries in an explosion and fire at the Partridge-Raleigh Oilfield in Raleigh, Mississippi. The incident occurred during welding work on oil production tanks when welding sparks ignited flammable hydrocarbon vapor venting from an open-ended pipe. The ignition led to tank explosions and a fire.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company Partridge-Raleigh, LLC
Location Raleigh, MS
Incident Date 06/05/2006
Investigation Status The CSB's final report was issued at a news conference in Jackson, Mississippi, on June 12, 2007.
Accident Type Hot Work - Explosion and Fire
Final Report Release Date 06/12/2007

What Happened

  • At about 8:30 a.m. on June 5, 2006, Stringer’s Oilfield Services contract workers were installing pipe from two production tanks to a third.
  • In the weeks preceding the incident, Stringer’s workers had relocated tanks 3 and 4 from other oilfield sites on the Partridge-Raleigh property to the #9 well site.
  • To connect the piping from tank 3 to tank 4, the workers had to weld a pipe fitting onto the side of, and a few inches below the top of, tank 4.
  • To prepare for the welding operation, they removed the access hatch at the base of tank 4 and entered the tank to remove the crude oil residue.
  • Then they flushed the tank with fresh water and allowed hydrocarbon vapor to evaporate for several days.
  • They did not clean out or purge tanks 2 and 3.
  • On the day of the incident, the welder inserted a lit oxy-acetylene welding torch into the hatch and then into the open nozzle on the opposite side of tank 4 to verify that all flammable vapor was removed from the tank before welding began.
  • The welder was not aware that this act, called “flashing” the tank, was an unsafe practice.
  • Next, the foreman climbed to the top of tank 4.
  • Two other maintenance workers climbed on top of tank 3; they then laid a ladder on the tank roof, extending it across the 4 foot space between tank 3 and 4, and held the ladder steady for the welder.
  • The welder attached his safety harness to the top of tank 4 and positioned himself on the ladder.
  • Almost immediately after the welder started welding, flammable hydrocarbon vapor venting from the open-ended pipe that was attached to tank 3 ignited.
  • The fire immediately flashed back into tank 3, spread through the overflow connecting pipe from tank 3 to tank 2, causing tank 2 to explode.
  • The lids of both tanks were blown off.
  • The three workers standing atop the tanks were thrown by the force of the explosion and fell to the ground.
  • The welder was also thrown off the ladder, but he was wearing a safety harness that prevented him from falling to the ground.
  • Volunteers from the local fire department and personnel from the county sheriff's office quickly responded to the incident site following an eyewitness' 9-1-1 emergency call.
  • Emergency Medical Technicians provided first-aid to the victims.
  • Two victims—the foreman and one of the maintenance workers—died from their injuries at the scene, and the third maintenance worker died while in transport to the hospital.
  • The welder survived, but suffered a broken ankle and hip.
  • Witnesses observed flames as high as 50 feet above tank 2, but no flames above tanks 3 or 4.
  • The fire department applied foam to the burning oil fire inside tank 2 and extinguished the fire in about 30 minutes.
  • The top of tank 2 landed about 250 yards away, and the top from tank 3 landed about 50 feet away.
  • Approximately 1000 gallons of crude oil remained inside tank 2 after the incident; tank 3 contained about 650 gallons of residue.
  • Tanks 1 and 4 sustained no visible damage.

Facility and Process Context

  • The incident occurred at the Partridge-Raleigh oilfield in Raleigh, Mississippi.
  • Partridge-Raleigh, LLC is an independent petroleum producer that operates stripper wells on leased parcels of land in Alabama and Mississippi.
  • Partridge-Raleigh is located between Jackson, MS and Hattiesburg MS, and began operating 30 Smith County oilfield wells in 1997.
  • Recommissioning after two leaking tanks were replaced was nearly complete at the #9 well when the explosion occurred.
  • Partridge-Raleigh employed five workers at the Smith County oilfield, and used oilfield service contractors to perform most of the well commissioning work including installing tanks, pumps, and piping.
  • Stringer’s Oilfield Services is located in Columbia, Mississippi, and employs about 45, including mechanics, welders, crane operators and laborers.
  • Stringer’s provides oilfield construction services and was under contract to Partridge-Raleigh to install the tanks and associated piping at the #9 well.

Consequences

  • Fatalities: Three contractor workers died.
  • Injuries: A fourth worker was seriously injured; the welder suffered a broken ankle and hip.
  • Environmental Release: Not reported.
  • Facility Damage: The lids of both tanks were blown off. The top of tank 2 landed about 250 yards away, and the top from tank 3 landed about 50 feet away. Tanks 1 and 4 sustained no visible damage.
  • Operational Impact: The fire was extinguished in about 30 minutes.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • The explosion was ignited by the welding being done on the side of tank 4.
  • The CSB concluded that the welding sparks ignited flammable vapor venting from the open-ended pipe of tank 3.
  • Flames from this ignition spread into tank 3, causing it to explode.
  • Then vapor inside tank 2 ignited followed by the explosion of the tank.

Contributing Factors

  • A gas detector was not used to test for flammable vapor.
  • The open pipe on the adjacent tank was not capped or otherwise isolated.
  • A makeshift work platform—a ladder placed between the tanks—was used.
  • All tanks were interconnected and some of the tanks contained flammable residue and crude oil.
  • Stringer’s workers did not isolate tanks 2 and 3, which contained flammable vapor, prior to beginning the welding operation.
  • The open-ended pipe of tank 3 was left uncapped and provided the source of hydrocarbon vapor.
  • Workers did not clean tanks 2 and 3 or cap the end of the pipe prior to beginning the welding job on tank 4.
  • A flammable gas detector was not used to ensure the absence of flammable vapor in the work area and inside tank 4 prior to welding.
  • Instead, workers used an open flame, or tank “flashing” to verify that flammable vapor was not present in the tank.
  • The contractor crew did not use safe work procedures for working on elevated surfaces.
  • Rather than construct a scaffold for the welder, the contractor crew used a ladder laid flat from atop an adjacent tank and extended it over to the tank being welded.
  • The makeshift work platform required two crew members to stand on top of tank 3 to brace the ladder in place while the welder worked.
  • The other crew member stood on top of tank 4.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • Stringer’s did not require the use of safe hot work procedures such as those found in API 2009, “Safe Welding, Cutting, and Hot Work Practices in the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries” in preparing and conducting the welding operation on the day of the incident.
  • Stringer’s had no hot work procedure for welding activities.
  • Stringer’s did not provide hot work safety training to its employees.
  • Neither Stringer’s nor Partridge-Raleigh required hot work permits.
  • Partridge-Raleigh did not have established safety requirements for personnel at the oilfield.
  • Stringer’s had not established a formal safety program for its employees, and Partridge-Raleigh did not require Stringer’s to have one.
  • Stringer’s managers and employees revealed that most welders hired by the company were expected to have knowledge or experience of how to weld; however, knowledge of safe hot work practices was not considered.
  • OSHA had not inspected Partridge-Raleigh or Stringer’s in the three years prior to the explosion.
  • OSHA did not have an emphasis program in Mississippi and did not conduct a planned inspection at any of nearly 6000 oilfields in the preceding five years in Mississippi.
  • OSHA declined to initiate an LEP for its Jackson, MS, Area office due to a lack of fatalities in the oil and gas sector in this area of the country.

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • A gas detector was not used to test for flammable vapor.
  • The open pipe on the adjacent tank was not capped or otherwise isolated.
  • A makeshift work platform—a ladder placed between the tanks—was used.
  • All tanks were interconnected and some of the tanks contained flammable residue and crude oil.
  • Stringer’s did not require the use of safe hot work procedures.
  • Stringer’s workers did not isolate tanks 2 and 3.
  • Workers did not clean tanks 2 and 3 or cap the end of the pipe.
  • A flammable gas detector was not used to ensure the absence of flammable vapor.
  • Stringer’s and Partridge-Raleigh did not require hot work permits.
  • Stringer’s had no hot work procedure for welding activities.
  • Stringer’s did not provide hot work safety training to its employees.
  • Stringer’s did not have a formal safety program.
  • Partridge-Raleigh did not have established safety requirements for personnel at the oilfield.

Recommendations

  1. 2006-07-I-MS-R1 | Recipient: Stringer’s Oil Field Services, Inc. | Status: Open | Summary: Develop and implement written procedures for hot work, tank cleaning, and work at elevated locations.
  2. 2006-07-I-MS-R2 | Recipient: Partridge-Raleigh, LLC | Status: Open | Summary: Establish written health and safety performance standards and performance metrics such as those found in Recommended Practice for Occupational Safety for Onshore Oil and Gas Production Operations.
  3. 2006-07-I-MS-R3 | Recipient: Mississippi State Oil & Gas Board | Status: Open | Summary: Establish a program to identify and refer to the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) potentially unsafe health and safety conditions observed during board field inspections of well sites and drilling operations. Ensure that the program includes written procedures that define how the referrals will be implemented, and training of field inspectors so that they are able to recognize the potentially unsafe health and safety conditions that should be referred to OSHA.
  4. 2006-07-I-MS-R4 | Recipient: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Jackson, MS Area Office | Status: Closed – Acceptable Alternative Action | Summary: Implement a Local Emphasis Program (LEP) to inspect companies in the oil and gas production and extraction sector.

Key Engineering Lessons

  • Hot work on or near oil production tanks requires verification of a flammable-vapor-free condition using appropriate detection methods, not open-flame "flashing."
  • Adjacent tanks, piping, and open-ended connections must be isolated or capped before welding begins when flammable residues or vapors may be present.
  • Work at elevated locations over tanks should use a stable engineered access method rather than a makeshift ladder platform.
  • Hot work controls, tank cleaning, and elevated-work procedures need to be written and implemented before field welding operations begin.

Source Notes

  • Priority 1 final report used as the primary authority for incident sequence, causes, consequences, and recommendations.
  • Priority 4 recommendation status page used only to update recommendation 2006-7-I-MS-R4 status to 'Closed – Acceptable Alternative Action' and to note OSHA's later alternative actions.
  • No external facts were added; empty fields in source documents were left empty in the consolidated dataset where applicable.

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