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Wendland 1H Well Fatal Explosion

Overview

On January 29, 2020, the Daniel H. Wendland 1-H well in Burleson County, Texas experienced a loss of well control during a workover operation while a new tubing head was being installed. Oil and gas escaped the well, found an ignition source within seconds, and produced a flash fire that fatally injured three contract workers and seriously injured another. The blowout destroyed the workover rig and several nearby vehicles and caused estimated property damage greater than $1 million.

Incident Details

  • location: Burleson County, TX
  • accident_type: Explosion and Fire
  • investigation_status: The CSB's final report was released on December 26, 2023.

Key Findings

  • direct_causes: ['The CSB determined that the cause of the Wendland 1-H well blowout was the lack of well planning regarding the implementation of well control.', 'The attempted well control barriers were ineffective, resulting in the release of hydrocarbons that ignited upon finding an ignition source.', 'Ineffective ignition source management contributed to the fire.']
  • contributing_factors: ['Insufficient industry guidance regarding well control for completed wells in underpressured reservoirs contributed to the blowout.', 'The absence of regulations governing onshore oil and gas operations contributed to the incident.', "The well's long completion interval and underpressured reservoir exacerbated the loss of fluid to the reservoir.", 'The use of open surface valves and stabbing valves as a well control barrier is not effective.', 'Chesapeake’s contractors neither evaluated the potential classified locations nor adequately controlled the siting of ignition sources that were in proximity to the open wellbore.', 'The power pack used to bolt the tubing head was not intrinsically safe, but Eagle workers believed that the equipment was intrinsically safe.', 'The workover history showed a common practice of pumping a fixed volume of workover fluid as a hydrostatic barrier and using a stabbing valve as the secondary barrier.']
  • organizational_systemic_factors: ['Chesapeake’s well control policies did not incorporate industry guidance on well planning.', 'Chesapeake did not adequately review the past history of the Wendland 1-H well.', 'Chesapeake did not provide written operating or contingency procedures for establishing and maintaining well control.', 'Chesapeake’s Barrier Policy did not incorporate appropriate methods for maintaining a hydrostatic barrier for a completed well in an underpressured reservoir.', 'Chesapeake’s policies did not incorporate industry guidance recommending hazard assessments when locating ignition sources and atmospheric monitors near potentially flammable atmospheres.', 'OSHA has historically exempted onshore oil and gas well drilling and servicing from its Control of Hazardous Energy regulation and Process Safety Management standard requirements.', 'The activities at the Wendland 1-H well at the time of the incident were not regulated by OSHA’s PSM standard.']

Consequences

  • fatalities: 3
  • injuries: 1 serious injury; 3 workers suffered serious burn injuries, and 2 of these later died from their injuries
  • environmental_release: Oil and gas escaped the well and ignited; the report describes a flash fire and release of hydrocarbons.
  • facility_damage: Estimated property damage greater than $1 million; workover rig and several nearby vehicles destroyed.
  • operational_impact: Workover operations were interrupted; the well was successfully shut in on January 31, 2020, and plugged and abandoned on April 5, 2021.

Recommendations

  • recommendation_id: 2020-04-I-TX-R1
  • recipient: Chesapeake Operating, L.L.C.
  • status: Closed – Acceptable Action
  • summary: Develop or revise policies incorporating the recommendations of API RP 59 regarding well planning, specifically the inclusion of well history review in conjunction with workover well control planning.
  • recommendation_id: 2020-04-I-TX-R2
  • recipient: American Petroleum Institute (API)
  • status: Open – Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
  • summary: Publish the following information in an appropriate document such as API RP 59 Recommended Practice for Well Control Operations: 1. A focused discussion on practices applicable to workover operations, including completed wells in underpressured reservoirs. Include well control methods applicable to workover operations, such as using continuous fluid addition, viscous fluids, bridging solids, and mechanical plugs. Also include a discussion on the well control challenges and hazards specific to workover operations; 2. Stabbing valves should not be considered as well control barriers for workover operations; and 3. Every well should be considered to have potential to flow, and therefore, should have two well control barriers, one of which should be a preventative barrier.
  • recommendation_id: 2020-04-I-TX-R3
  • recipient: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
  • status: Open – Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
  • summary: Remove the exemption for oil and gas drilling and well servicing from the Control of Hazardous Energy standard (29 CFR 1910.147) and expand its applicability to cover oil and gas production and workover operations.
  • recommendation_id: 2020-04-I-TX-R4
  • recipient: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
  • status: Open – Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
  • summary: Promulgate a new standard with prescriptive requirements, similar to the Control of Hazardous Energy standard, as well as a performance-based safety management system framework, similar to the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM), that applies to the drilling, production, and servicing/workover activities surrounding onshore oil and gas wells. At a minimum, this standard should include prescriptive requirements for primary and secondary barriers for well control; detailed written drilling, production, and servicing procedures; management of change requirements; risk assessment of hazards; RAGAGEP; a Well Construction Interface Document; flow checks; employee participation; maintaining critical well information; analyzing and assessing hazards during all phases and steps for well servicing; operating procedures; and documentation of well control plans using acceptable methods for monitoring effectiveness.

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