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Kaltech Industries Waste Mixing Explosion

Overview

On April 25, 2002, an explosion occurred at Kaltech Industries Group, Inc., a sign manufacturer in the Chelsea neighborhood of New York City. The explosion resulted from a reaction between waste chemicals in the basement of a mixed-use commercial building. Damage extended as high as the fifth floor. Thirty-six people were injured seriously enough to seek hospital treatment, including members of the public and firefighters.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company Kaltech Industries Group, Inc.
Location New York, NY
Incident Date 04/25/2002
Investigation Status The Board approved the final report on this investigation at a public meeting in New York City on September 30, 2003.
Accident Type Reactive Incident Investigation
Final Report Release Date 09/30/2003

What Happened

  • Kaltech employees were consolidating hazardous waste from smaller containers into larger drums in the basement of the building.
  • A worker and a helper gathered the subject carboy and approximately 10 others for consolidation and used a pump to transfer the liquid from the smaller containers into a 55-gallon plastic drum.
  • The contractor departed the building on the morning of April 25 with 13 drums of waste, including 12 drums of corrosive spent etching solution and one drum of solvent and paint waste.
  • Just moments after the workers left the immediate area where the waste consolidation was performed, vigorous chemical activity commenced in one of the 55-gallon drums.
  • Other workers heard a hissing sound rising to a jetting noise, and liquid spewed upward from the drum.
  • An explosion occurred seconds later.
  • A fire ignited in the area where the workers had consolidated the waste.
  • The fire sprinkler system activated and contained the fire.

Facility and Process Context

  • Kaltech Industries Group, Inc. leased space at 123 West 19th Street in Manhattan for about 10 years.
  • The 10-story masonry structure was built in 1902 and was occupied by a variety of tenants, including commercial, professional service, and manufacturing tenants.
  • At the time of the incident, Kaltech occupied the basement of the building and portions of the mezzanine and first floor.
  • Most manufacturing operations were conducted in the basement, while painting and coating were performed on the mezzanine level.
  • Kaltech manufactured metal signs and used hazardous chemicals in its operations.
  • Kaltech generated hazardous waste during normal operations and was a large quantity generator under EPA RCRA provisions.
  • The facility was located in a mixed-occupancy building in a densely populated urban area.
  • Kaltech held an FDNY Bureau of Fire Prevention permit for the use and storage of up to 1,000 gallons of paint and lacquer, and up to 550 gallons of flammable solvents.
  • Kaltech had not applied for required Bureau of Fire Prevention permits for other hazardous materials, such as hydrochloric acid and nitric acid.
  • Many of the manufacturing employees were immigrants, some with limited English literacy.

Consequences

  • Fatalities: 0
  • Injuries: At least 36 people were injured, including six firefighters and 14 members of the public. Thirty-one people were taken to hospitals; of 16 admitted for treatment, four had critical injuries and required intensive care.
  • Environmental release: NYCDEP hazardous materials team responded to the chemical release. The scene was declared a lead- and asbestos-contaminated zone.
  • Facility damage: There was extensive damage to the 10-story building. The blast dislodged portions of the basement ceiling and inside walls. Portions of the elevator shaft masonry walls in the basement, on the mezzanine, and on the first floor were blown out. A high interior wall on the mezzanine collapsed, and windows in the stairwell and elevator shaft blew out from the ground level up to the fifth floor. Parts of the building façade fell to the sidewalk.
  • Operational impact: Street traffic was restricted for several days. The New York City Building Department issued an order for all tenants to vacate the building pending a structural evaluation. Tenants experienced significant business interruption because they were not permitted to return to the premises for many weeks. Vehicular traffic flow was also disrupted because 19th Street remained closed for 2 weeks. Operations at Kaltech were suspended.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • It is likely that a chemical reaction caused the explosion when the acid was combined with lacquer thinner from another container.
  • After the wastes were mixed in the drum, a chemical reaction most likely occurred, which rapidly generated gas or vapor.
  • Because neither the gas nor the vapor could vent fast enough through the open bung hole in the top, the internal pressure increased until the drum suddenly burst.
  • A reaction between nitric acid and lacquer thinner is most likely to have occurred.

Contributing Factors

  • The highly confined environment of the basement offered limited pathways for the explosion pressure to vent.
  • The blast was partially relieved via the building’s center hall stairway.
  • The associated shock caused the stairwell to collapse.
  • A stairway from the northwest part of the basement leading to the mezzanine was the only other exit pathway, but it was damaged and obstructed by large pieces of ceiling masonry.
  • The blast vented through the freight elevator shaft by blowing in the doors at the basement station.
  • The fire was limited and quickly controlled by sprinklers.
  • The ignition source may have been one of the many electrical devices in the general area of the consolidation.
  • None of these devices—including lighting, wall outlets, circuit breakers, and switches—were suitable for use around flammable solvents.
  • The metal carboy of nitric acid was not identified or labeled by Kaltech, nor were the other carboys whose contents were pumped into the 55-gallon drum prior to the explosion and fire.
  • The employees engaged in this task did not know the identity of the materials, their hazards, or their compatibility.
  • Kaltech did not maintain a list of hazardous substances present in the facility.
  • Waste containers were not labeled.
  • Kaltech had no training plans, and workers received no formal training on the hazards of materials in the workplace.
  • The workers were never shown MSDSs, nor did they have access to them.
  • Kaltech did not have an MSDS for nitric acid onsite.
  • The Fire Prevention Code does not specifically require the identification or labeling of chemicals.
  • The Fire Prevention Code does not prohibit the mixing of incompatible chemicals in manufacturing facilities.
  • The Fire Prevention Code does not mandate that MSDSs be made available to workers onsite.
  • The Fire Prevention Code does not require that employees who handle hazardous materials be made aware of the hazards and be trained in methods of safe handling.
  • The Fire Prevention Code does not address some recent developments in hazardous materials safety, such as requirements for chemical identification, labeling, and training; and prohibitions against mixing incompatible materials.
  • The New York City Fire Prevention Code has significant gaps in its coverage of hazardous materials, such as nitric acid, with regard to chemical identification and labeling, MSDS requirements, worker training, and separation of incompatible materials at manufacturing facilities.
  • Kaltech did not manage its hazardous waste operations in accordance with established Federal, State, and local requirements.
  • Waste materials were mixed without being identified or characterized, and no effort was made to determine compatibility among materials.
  • Employees received no formal training on proper hazardous waste management practices.
  • Inadequate inspections by Federal, State, and local authorities allowed unsafe practices to go uncorrected.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • Kaltech had no chemical hazard communication program for employees.
  • Kaltech did not manage its hazardous waste operations in accordance with established Federal, State, and local requirements.
  • Kaltech did not develop or maintain a chemical hazard communication program in accordance with established OSHA standards.
  • Kaltech did not manage its hazardous waste in accordance with established EPA regulations.
  • Kaltech had no formal training program and did not maintain any records of training.
  • The company declined hazardous waste testing services offered by the hazardous waste contractor.
  • The company declined waste management training offered by the hazardous waste contractor.
  • The two Kaltech owners closely managed day-to-day operations.
  • A foreman supervised the manufacturing activity.
  • Many of the manufacturing employees were immigrants, some of whom had limited English literacy.
  • The majority of Kaltech employees were immigrants.
  • The owners stated that they outsourced zinc etching.
  • During employee interviews, CSB investigators retained translation services for Polish, Spanish, and Swahili.

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • There was no compiled list of hazardous chemicals present in the facility.
  • Containers of wastes and certain chemicals onsite were not labeled.
  • Employees received no formal training on the hazards of specific chemicals in the workplace.
  • Material safety data sheets were unavailable to the workforce.
  • Waste materials were mixed without being identified or characterized.
  • No effort was made to determine compatibility among materials.
  • The Fire Prevention Code does not specifically require the identification or labeling of chemicals.
  • The Fire Prevention Code does not prohibit the mixing of incompatible chemicals in manufacturing facilities.
  • The Fire Prevention Code does not mandate that MSDSs be made available to workers onsite.
  • The Fire Prevention Code does not require that employees who handle hazardous materials be made aware of the hazards and be trained in methods of safe handling.
  • FDNY had not inspected the basement area.
  • Kaltech was never inspected during its decade of operation as a hazardous waste generator.
  • The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation had never inspected hazardous waste operations at Kaltech.
  • OSHA had never conducted a workplace safety inspection of Kaltech.
  • The facility inventory form submitted to NYCDEP was incomplete.
  • Many chemicals stored onsite were not declared, including nitric acid.
  • The nitric acid and other carboys that Kaltech attempted to consolidate immediately prior to the explosion and fire were not labeled.
  • There was no hazard communication program, written or otherwise.
  • MSDSs were not readily accessible to employees.
  • The employees who pumped the contents from the carboys prior to the incident incorrectly assumed the identity of the materials.

Recommendations

  1. Recommendation ID: 2002-02-I-NY-R1
    Recipient: The Mayor and Council of the City of New York
    Status: Not specified
    Summary: Revise the Fire Prevention Code, Title 27, Chapter 4, of the New York City Administrative Code, to achieve more comprehensive control over the storage and use of hazardous materials, such as nitric acid, that could cause a fire or explosion when inadvertently mixed with incompatible substances. Base these revisions on model fire codes such as the International Code Council International Fire Code and the National Fire Protection Association Fire Protection Code.

  2. Recommendation ID: 2002-02-I-NY-R2
    Recipient: The Mayor and Council of the City of New York
    Status: Not specified
    Summary: Amend the New York City Administrative Code § 27-4267 to require that the owner or other person having charge of a mixed-occupancy building with a hazardous occupancy be required to develop a building hazardous materials safety plan and designate a responsible individual to ensure that the plan is implemented; the plan incorporate information from hazardous materials management plans, inventory statements, right-to-know facility inventory forms, and Fire Prevention Code permits of any tenants who use hazardous materials; and the plan be distributed to all tenants.

  3. Recommendation ID: 2002-02-I-NY-R3
    Recipient: The Mayor and Council of the City of New York
    Status: Not specified
    Summary: Ensure that the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) and the Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) establish a program to exchange facility information regarding hazardous chemical inventories to enhance inspection and enforcement activities.

  4. Recommendation ID: 2002-02-I-NY-R4
    Recipient: New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), Region 2
    Status: Not specified
    Summary: Raise the priority of inspections of large quantity generators located in mixed-occupancy facilities within densely populated areas.

  5. Recommendation ID: 2002-02-I-NY-R5
    Recipient: New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), Region 2
    Status: Not specified
    Summary: Share data, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) biennial report, with the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) and Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) concerning the identity, location, and hazardous waste inventories of large quantity generators within the City to enhance inspection and enforcement activities.

  6. Recommendation ID: 2002-02-I-NY-R6
    Recipient: Kaltech Industries Group, Inc., and Beyond Signs, Inc.
    Status: Not specified
    Summary: Develop and implement a written hazard communication program that includes maintaining a list of hazardous materials used in the workplace; labeling of hazardous materials; maintaining material safety data sheets and making them available to the workforce; and training of employees on chemical hazards and their safeguards in languages understood by the workforce.

  7. Recommendation ID: 2002-02-I-NY-R7
    Recipient: Kaltech Industries Group, Inc., and Beyond Signs, Inc.
    Status: Not specified
    Summary: Implement hazardous waste management practices that include characterization of unknown waste materials prior to mixing or disposal; labeling of all waste containers with the words “Hazardous Waste” and any other wording necessary to communicate the specific hazards associated with the material; and a formal hazardous waste management training program.

  8. Recommendation ID: 2002-02-I-NY-R8
    Recipient: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Region II
    Status: Not specified
    Summary: Disseminate information on the requirements of the Hazard Communication Standard, 29 CFR 1910.1200, in the major languages spoken by workers in New York City with limited or no English speaking proficiency.

  9. Recommendation ID: 2002-02-I-NY-R9
    Recipient: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Region II
    Status: Not specified
    Summary: Establish a complaint and referral system with the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) to provide for a coordinated enforcement effort that addresses policy and practice for referring to OSHA possible health and safety violations or unsafe conditions observed by FDNY personnel in the course of conducting inspections, but outside the scope of FDNY responsibility; and periodic training programs for FDNY personnel on how to recognize and refer serious workplace safety and health problems.

  10. Recommendation ID: 2002-02-I-NY-R10
    Recipient: New York City
    Status: Not specified
    Summary: Establish a complaint and referral system with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA; Region II) to provide for a coordinated enforcement effort that addresses policy and practice for referring to OSHA possible health and safety violations or unsafe conditions observed by FDNY personnel in the course of conducting inspections, but outside the scope of FDNY responsibility; and periodic training programs for FDNY personnel on how to recognize and refer serious workplace safety and health problems.

  11. Recommendation ID: 1
    Recipient: Mayor and the Council of the City of New York
    Status: approved
    Summary: Revise the fire prevention code, Title 27, Chapter 4 of the New York City Administrative Code to achieve more comprehensive control over the storage and use of hazardous materials such as nitric acid that could cause a fire or explosion when inadvertently mixed with incompatible substances; base these revisions on model fire codes such as the International Code Council's International Fire Code and the National Fire Protection Association's Fire Protection Code; require that all hazardous materials be identified and labeled; that hazardous materials permit applications include a submission of a management plan and an inventory statement; that the material safety data sheets be accessible to the workforce; that the personnel working with hazardous materials be trained on the hazards and safe handling techniques in languages understood by the workforce; and that incompatible chemicals be adequately separated to improve safety in manufacturing facilities; and that New York City fire inspectors receive sufficient training to meet the skills and knowledge to verify code compliance and recognize problems regarding storage, handling, and use of hazardous material.

  12. Recommendation ID: 2
    Recipient: Mayor and the Council of the City of New York
    Status: approved
    Summary: Amend the New York City Administrative Code, paragraph 27-4267 to require that the owner or other person having charge of a mixed-occupancy building with a hazardous occupancy be required to develop a building hazardous material safety plan and designate a responsible individual to ensure that the plan is implemented; incorporate information from the hazardous materials management plans, inventory statements, right-to-know facility inventory forms, and fire prevention code permits of any tenants who use hazardous materials; and distribute the building hazardous material safety plan to all tenants.

  13. Recommendation ID: 3
    Recipient: Mayor and the Council of the City of New York
    Status: approved
    Summary: Ensure that the New York City Fire Department and the Department of Environmental Protection establish a program to exchange facility information regarding hazardous chemical inventories to enhance inspection and enforcement activities.

  14. Recommendation ID: 4
    Recipient: New York Department of Environmental Conservation
    Status: approved
    Summary: Raise the priority of inspections of large-quantity generators located in mixed occupancy facilities within densely populated areas.

  15. Recommendation ID: 5
    Recipient: New York Department of Environmental Conservation
    Status: approved
    Summary: Share Region 2 data such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act by annual report with the New York City Fire Department and the Department of Environmental Protection concerning the identity, location, and hazardous waste inventories of large-quantity generators within the city to enhance inspection and enforcement activities.

  16. Recommendation ID: 6
    Recipient: Kaltech Industries Group, Incorporated, and Beyond Signs, Incorporated
    Status: approved
    Summary: Develop and implement a written hazard communication program that includes maintenance of a list of hazardous materials used in the workplace; labeling of hazardous materials; maintaining and making material safety data sheets available to the workforce; and training of employees on chemical hazards and their safeguards in languages understood by the workforce.

  17. Recommendation ID: 7
    Recipient: Kaltech Industries Group, Incorporated, and Beyond Signs, Incorporated
    Status: approved
    Summary: Implement hazardous waste management practices that include characterization of unknown waste materials prior to mixing or disposal; labeling of all waste containers with the words "Hazardous Waste" or any other language necessary to communicate the specific hazards associated with the material; and implementation of a formal hazardous waste management training program.

  18. Recommendation ID: 8
    Recipient: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA Region II
    Status: approved
    Summary: Disseminate information on the requirements of the hazard communication standard, 29 CFR 1910.1200, in the major languages spoken by workers in New York City with limited or no English-speaking proficiency.

  19. Recommendation ID: 9
    Recipient: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA Region II
    Status: approved
    Summary: Establish a complaint and referral system with the New York City Fire Department to provide for a coordinated enforcement effort that addresses policy and practice for referring to OSHA possible safety and health violations or unsafe conditions observed by the Fire Department personnel in the course of conducting inspections but outside of Fire Department responsibility; and periodic training programs for Fire Department personnel on how to recognize and refer serious workplace safety and health problems.

  20. Recommendation ID: 10
    Recipient: New York City Fire Department
    Status: approved
    Summary: The report also contains an identical mirror recommendation for the New York City Fire Department.

Key Engineering Lessons

  • Unknown waste materials should be characterized before mixing or disposal.
  • Hazardous materials and waste containers should be labeled so workers can identify contents and compatibility.
  • Material safety data sheets should be maintained and made available to the workforce.
  • Workers handling hazardous materials should receive formal training on chemical hazards and safe handling techniques in languages understood by the workforce.
  • Incompatible chemicals should be adequately separated to prevent inadvertent mixing.
  • Hazardous materials management in mixed-occupancy buildings requires building-level planning and information sharing among tenants and authorities.
  • Inspection and enforcement systems need access to facility hazardous chemical inventory information to identify unsafe conditions.

Source Notes

  • Priority 1 final report was used to resolve conflicts where it differed from supporting documents.
  • Supporting documents were used to supplement event sequence, context, and consequences where consistent with the final report.
  • Some supporting-document terms appear as transcription variants or misspellings; official terminology from the final report was preferred where available.
  • The final report and supporting documents consistently describe the incident as a chemical waste-mixing explosion involving nitric acid and lacquer thinner in a basement waste consolidation activity.

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