Skip to content

Little General Store Propane Explosion

Overview

On January 30, 2007, propane released from a storage tank at the Little General convenience store and gas station in Ghent, West Virginia, formed a flammable vapor cloud that entered the building and exploded. Four people were killed and five others were seriously injured. The store was destroyed.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company Little General Store, Inc.
Location Ghent, West Virginia
Incident Date 2007-01-30
Investigation Status Final report approved by the Board at a public meeting in Beckley, West Virginia, on September 25, 2008.
Accident Type Flammable Vapor Investigation
Final Report Release Date 2008-09-25

What Happened

  • 1988 - Southern Sun buys the incident tank and places it in propane service.
  • Late 1994 - Southern Sun relocates the incident tank from its original installation to the Little General Store in Ghent and installs it against the store’s exterior back wall.
  • 1996 - Ferrellgas buys the Southern Sun propane business and performs a pre-acquisition review of the business and operations, including an inspection of some of Southern Sun’s propane systems.
  • 1996 to 2007 - Ferrellgas drivers fill the incident tank about 14 times per year conducting about 140 pre-fill inspections.
  • April and June 2000 – Ferrellgas employees perform two Installation Reviews on the propane system at Little General.
  • August 2005 – Thompson Gas and Electric Service, Inc. and Appalachian Heating form ThompsonGas Propane Partners, LLC.
  • September 2006 – Appalachian Heating’s only propane service technician completes training and becomes fully qualified to install propane tank systems.
  • Fall 2006 – Little General Store, Inc., begins changing propane suppliers from Ferrellgas to ThompsonGas Propane Partners.
  • December 2006 – Appalachian Heating reassigns an HVAC technician to the propane business.
  • January 2007 – The two propane service technicians from Appalachian Heating began installing a new Thompson Gas tank and associated equipment at Little General.
  • On the morning of Tuesday, January 30, the two propane service technicians traveled separately to the Little General Store.
  • At around 9:15 am, witnesses observed both of their trucks at the store.
  • By 9:30 am the lead technician had left the store to make a delivery 31 miles northwest of Little General; the junior technician remained alone at the store.
  • For the next hour, the junior technician worked alone while he prepared to transfer propane from the Ferrellgas tank to the Thompson tank.
  • Around 10:25 am, the junior technician removed a plug from the liquid withdrawal valve on the Ferrellgas tank.
  • When he removed the plug, liquid propane unexpectedly began spraying from the valve.
  • At 10:28 am, the junior technician called the lead technician, who was still offsite, to report the problem.
  • At 10:31 am, the lead technician called Thompson technical support for guidance.
  • At 10:40 am, the junior technician called 911 to summon help from emergency services.
  • After the 911 call, the junior technician called the lead technician again.
  • The first to arrive, at about 10:47 am, was a captain from the Ghent Volunteer Fire Department.
  • Shortly thereafter, two EMTs arrived in an ambulance.
  • Just after 10:50 am, the lead technician returned to the store.
  • A firefighter arrived in his personal vehicle to assist with the emergency and checked in with the IC.
  • As the firefighter began walking to the front of the store, the propane ignited and exploded.
  • The explosion killed four near the tanks and seriously injured others inside the building.
  • The building was leveled, a responding ambulance was destroyed, and many parked vehicles were damaged.

Facility and Process Context

  • Little General Store, Inc. operates 48 convenience stores throughout southern and central West Virginia and western Virginia.
  • The Ghent store was a combination gasoline station and convenience market.
  • At the time of the incident, the Ghent store and three others included pizzerias, which used propane for cooking.
  • The propane system at Little General consisted of a stationary 500-gallon storage tank and two supply regulators to reduce the pressure of the propane for pizza ovens used in the store.
  • The storage tank had five connections: a fill connection fitted with an internal check valve; a liquid level gage; a relief valve; a service valve; and a liquid withdrawal valve fitted to an internal dip tube.
  • In 1994, Southern Sun installed the 500-gallon propane tank directly against the Little General store’s exterior back wall.
  • The tank remained in this position and in operation until the day of the incident.
  • The position of the tank was contrary to both the West Virginia Fire Code and the OSHA LP gas standard.
  • The open overhang and restroom exhaust ducts provided a direct pathway for propane to enter the building.
  • The Ferrellgas inspection and audit program did not identify the tank location as a hazard.
  • Ferrellgas management’s quality review program functions as a basic safety inspection rather than a management systems audit.

Consequences

  • Fatalities: Four killed.
  • Injuries: Six injured; the report states two emergency responders and two propane service technicians were killed and six others were injured. It also states four store employees inside the building and two other emergency responders outside the store were injured.
  • Environmental release: Liquid propane unexpectedly released from the liquid withdrawal valve, formed a vapor cloud behind the store, and entered the store through openings in the roof overhang.
  • Facility damage: The explosion leveled the store, destroyed a responding ambulance, and damaged many parked vehicles.
  • Operational impact: The store was destroyed and the propane release and explosion ended the incident; the report also states the building was leveled and the propane system was involved in a transfer to a newly installed tank.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • A defect in the existing tank’s liquid withdrawal valve caused it to malfunction and remain in an open position.
  • The placement of the 500-gallon propane tank against the building’s exterior wall provided propane a direct pathway into the store’s interior during the release.
  • The junior technician was not formally trained and left alone to work on the day of the incident.
  • Emergency responders were not trained to recognize the need for immediate evacuation during liquid propane releases.

Contributing Factors

  • The junior technician was unaware of the existence and function of the telltale due to inexperience and lack of training and removed the plug completely.
  • The junior technician had no written procedure for his activities on the day of the incident.
  • The junior technician had not trained with CETP and had not received any other formal propane service training.
  • The lead technician’s training had not included an emergency response component.
  • The IC allowed the propane service technician to try to correct the propane release while the IC managed the scene.
  • The IC was likely unaware that the junior technician was neither trained nor experienced in propane transfer operations and propane emergencies.
  • The IC was likely unaware that the building was filling with a flammable mixture of propane and air.
  • The IC had not trained for or practiced hazardous materials emergency response in almost 10 years.
  • None of the Ghent Volunteer Fire Department firefighters had participated in the Propane Emergencies training program.
  • Raleigh County 911 uses guide cards for health emergencies and injuries only.
  • The liquid withdrawal valve was jammed in the open position.
  • A manufacturing defect likely caused the valve to jam.
  • A part of the internal mechanism was smaller than specified by the manufacturer causing the valve stem to seize.
  • The junior technician was not formally trained and left alone to work on the day of the incident.
  • Responder training was not sufficient to help them to recognize the need for immediate evacuation during a liquid propane release.
  • The placement of the propane tank was critical.
  • The propane jet from the tank had a direct pathway into the building from both the vented roof overhang and the bathroom vents.
  • These pathways allowed large quantities of propane to enter both the attic space and the occupied portion of the building.
  • The Ferrellgas inspection audit program did not identify the tank location as a hazard.
  • The hazard remained uncorrected for more than ten years.
  • The junior technician had no training on the function of the plug or the valve.
  • The junior technician had not been trained on the importance of checking for the escaping gas.
  • Propane technicians around the nation are generally not trained in propane emergency response.
  • Neither propane technician was trained to know that evacuation was the best course of action.
  • The Captain who responded first to the release at The Little General had last attended hazardous materials response course in 1998, nine years before the incident.
  • Neither the fire fighters nor the EMTs who responded to the initial report of a propane leak had received propane emergency training.
  • There is no guide card to help 911 operators collect information or dispense lifesaving advice for callers reporting propane emergencies.
  • The excess flow feature had a elastomeric gasket that had corroded and was crumbling and could not seal the valve when the release began.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • Ferrellgas’ acquisition of Southern Sun included a pre-acquisition review and a year to identify and request correction of deficiencies, but the tank placement was not identified as deficient.
  • Ferrellgas performed two FIRs on the Little General Store installation in 2000; neither inspector noted the placement of the tank on the form.
  • At least six Ferrellgas delivery drivers and service technicians were in a position to identify and report the incorrect placement of the tank behind Little General; none did.
  • The employees who filled and inspected the tank believed that its location was approved.
  • The SCGM customer installation audits for the Beckley and Princeton offices were likely not conducted.
  • Ferrellgas’ instructions on conducting audits merely recommend SCGMs inspect customer installations that were filled on the day prior to the review or inspect those that the manager is driving past.
  • West Virginia does not require propane service technicians to be trained, certified, or licensed.
  • No states require emergency response training for propane service technicians.
  • The OSHA standard requires training but does not elaborate on this requirement.
  • NFPA 58 recommends training but does not elaborate on what constitutes initial training.
  • The Propane Emergencies training program was not used by the Ghent Volunteer Fire Department.
  • The West Virginia Fire Commission requirement does not specifically address recurrent training.
  • Propane safety and emergency training is voluntary for fire department personnel in West Virginia.
  • West Virginia and 35 other states do not require training for propane service technicians, nor any certification or qualification.
  • The most applicable national standards from OSHA and the National Fire Protection Association state that propane technicians and those transferring propane must be trained, but these requirements do not list training criteria or curricula and do not mandate knowledge or skills testing.
  • West Virginia requires hazardous materials incident response training for its fire fighters, but the training requirement is for a minimum of four hours of instruction with no requirement for recurrence.
  • The propane industry has developed a propane emergency program, but in West Virginia this course is voluntary for fire fighters.
  • Appalachian had no written protocols or procedures.
  • The agreement between ThomsonGas and Appalachian was finalized in August of 2005.
  • The Propane Education and Research Council is chartered by Congress to promote the safe use of propane as a fuel in the United States.
  • Half a cent of every gallon of odorized propane sold in the United States goes to PERC for annual funding.
  • The certified employee training program is prepared by PERC and administered by the National Propane Gas Association and their affiliates throughout the United States.
  • Ferrellgas's responsibility was to inspect the tank and make sure that the tank is operating and functioning properly.
  • WVOEMS rules and codes did not require annual hazardous material responder refresher training for all EMS personnel in West Virginia, as required in EPA and OSHA regulations.
  • WVOEMS approved a new policy requiring all state EMTs to have four hours annually of HazMat Awareness training

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • The telltale drilled through the threaded portion of the plug did not prevent the release from becoming uncontrolled.
  • The junior technician did not recognize the defect in the withdrawal valve.
  • The junior technician did not evacuate the area.
  • The propane service technicians, emergency responders, and store employees did not evacuate the area as recommended by nationally accepted guidance for propane emergencies.
  • The IC did not establish command in accordance with NIMS.
  • The IC did not evacuate the area from a safe distance as the first task.
  • The 911 operator did not have a guide card or protocol to help evaluate the situation, collect pertinent information, and provide guidance to the caller.
  • Ferrellgas training materials discuss tank placement and clearly state that 500-gallon propane tanks must be at least 10 feet from buildings, but the tank remained against the building.
  • The OSHA standard requires that owners of propane tank(s) be notified prior to work being done on their tank(s) by others, but Appalachian Heating did not notify Ferrellgas.
  • The Fire Commission’s policy specifically requires hazardous materials response training, but the requirement does not specifically address recurrent training.
  • The liquid withdrawal valve was jammed in the open position.
  • The excess flow feature did not operate properly.
  • The tell tale warning on the safety plug was not heeded.
  • The junior technician was left unsupervised.
  • The junior technician had no training on the function of the plug or the valve.
  • No evacuation occurred during the propane release.
  • The Ferrellgas inspection audit program did not identify the tank location as a hazard.
  • There was no guide card for propane emergencies for 911 operators.
  • Neither the fire fighters nor the EMTs who responded to the initial report of a propane leak had received propane emergency training.
  • annual hazardous material responder refresher training for all EMS personnel in West Virginia
  • awareness level training
  • protecting themselves, calling for trained assistance, and securing the area

Recommendations

  1. 2007-04-I-WV-R1 | Recipient: Governor and Legislature of the State of West Virginia | Status: Not specified | Summary: Require training and qualification of individuals who operate bulk propane plants, dispense and deliver propane, install and service propane systems, and install propane appliances. The training and qualification requirements should be comparable to those of existing propane industry programs such as the Certified Employee Training Program.
  2. 2007-04-I-WV-R2 | Recipient: West Virginia Fire Commission | Status: Not specified | Summary: Revise the Fire Commission rules and codes to require annual hazardous materials response refresher training for all firefighters in West Virginia.
  3. 2007-04-I-WV-R3 | Recipient: West Virginia Fire Commission | Status: Not specified | Summary: Revise the Fire Commission rules and codes to require that all West Virginia fire departments perform at least one hazardous material response drill annually.
  4. 2007-04-I-WV-R4 | Recipient: West Virginia Office of Emergency Medical Services | Status: Closed – Acceptable Action | Summary: Revise the Office of Emergency Medical Services rules and codes to require annual hazardous materials response refresher training for all emergency medical personnel in West Virginia.
  5. 2007-04-I-WV-R5 | Recipient: National Fire Protection Association | Status: Closed- Acceptable Action | Summary: In the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code (NFPA 58) "Qualifications for Personnel" section, specify training requirements (including supervised on-the-job training), training curricula, competencies, and testing through written examination and performance evaluation, or reference a nationally recognized curriculum for these requirements.
  6. 2007-04-I-WV-R6 | Recipient: Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials | Status: Not specified | Summary: Develop a guide card for propane emergencies to assist 911 operators in the collection of pertinent information on propane emergencies. The questionnaire in Section 1.9.1 in the Propane Education and Research Council’s Certified Employee Training Program may be used as a model.
  7. 2007-04-I-WV-R7 | Recipient: Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials | Status: Not specified | Summary: Revise the Certified Employee Training Program to include procedures for transfer of liquid propane from tank to tank, or the prohibition of the transfer of liquid propane from tank to tank.
  8. 2007-04-I-WV-R8 | Recipient: Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials | Status: Not specified | Summary: Revise the Certified Employee Training Program to include emergency response guidance for propane service technicians who respond to propane emergencies similar to guidance provided to emergency responders in the Propane Emergencies program.
  9. 2007-04-I-WV-R9 | Recipient: Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials | Status: Not specified | Summary: Submit a request to the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration for a letter of interpretation to determine if the Certified Employee Training Program curriculum meets the training requirements in 29 CFR 1910.110.
  10. 2007-04-I-WV-R10 | Recipient: Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials | Status: Not specified | Summary: Work with the West Virginia E911 Council with development of propane emergency guidance by providing the Council with the customer leak questionnaire located in Section 1.9.1 of the Certified Employee Training Program and technical assistance.
  11. 2007-04-I-WV-R11 | Recipient: West Virginia E911 Council | Status: Not specified | Summary: Work with the National Propane Gas Association to develop and distribute propane emergency guidance for use by all county and municipal 911 communication centers in West Virginia.
  12. 2007-04-I-WV-R12 | Recipient: Ferrellgas | Status: Not specified | Summary: Establish and implement a comprehensive safety management system that includes at a minimum: an auditing program developed in accordance with generally accepted methodologies to monitor the performance and effectiveness of safety management systems and personnel at all levels; an inspection program that uses NFPA 58 as a guide to systematically inspect all customer propane systems and identify all deficiencies; a means of tracking audits and inspections and identified deficiencies; a means of tracking corrective actions; a means of collecting and using audit and inspection data for trend analysis and organizational learning; a means of periodically reporting audit and inspection trends to the Board of Directors and Managing Board; and a provision for periodic safety management system audits conducted by a third party competent in the requirements of NFPA 58.

Key Engineering Lessons

  • A malfunctioning liquid withdrawal valve can create an uncontrolled propane release that rapidly escalates if the release path is not isolated.
  • Tank placement against a building can provide a direct pathway for propane to enter occupied spaces during a release.
  • Inspection programs must identify and correct noncompliant tank locations, not merely record routine fill or service activity.
  • Propane transfer work requires formal training, written procedures, and supervision for less experienced technicians.
  • Emergency response guidance for propane releases must emphasize immediate evacuation and safe-distance incident control.
  • 911 and responder protocols need propane-specific guidance to support early recognition and protective action.

Source Notes

  • Consolidated using the highest-priority available extracts; all provided documents had source_priority 4.
  • Official terminology was preserved where stated in the source documents, including recommendation wording and status labels.
  • Where source documents differed on counts or phrasing, the final report and status summaries were used to resolve conflicts when applicable.
  • Some fields combine facts from multiple extracts because the documents describe the same incident from different perspectives.

Similar Incidents

Incidents sharing the same equipment, root causes, or hazard types.

Same Equipment

Same Root Cause

Same Hazard

← View in Knowledge Graph