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Allied Terminals Fertilizer Tank Collapse

Overview

On November 12, 2008, a 2-million-gallon liquid fertilizer tank, Tank 201, catastrophically failed at the Allied Terminals facility in Chesapeake, Virginia. Two workers were seriously injured. Two members of the public required treatment likely related to ammonia vapor exposure. Liquid fertilizer flooded portions of a nearby residential neighborhood. At least 200,000 gallons were not recovered, and some entered the southern branch of the Elizabeth River. The CSB final report identified failures related to weld quality, post-welding inspection, and safety procedures for first fill after major modifications.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company Allied Terminals, Inc.
Location Chesapeake, VA
Incident Date 11/11/2008
Investigation Status The CSB released its final report on 05/27/2009.
Accident Type Community Impact Investigation
Final Report Release Date 05/27/2009

What Happened

  • Circa 1929 – A 2-million-gallon riveted petroleum storage tank, later known as Tank 201, was constructed at a site at the end of Rosemont Avenue in what is now the City of Chesapeake.
  • Late 2000 – Allied negotiated the purchase of an idled petroleum terminal, which included Tank 201.
  • December 12, 2000 – Allied contracted AEC Engineering, Inc. to inspect storage tanks at the idled terminal.
  • January 2001 – AEC inspected Tank 201 and prepared a preliminary report establishing a maximum liquid level of 18.583 feet for the liquid fertilizer Allied intended to store in the tank.
  • February 2001 – Allied canceled the AEC contract. AEC did not issue a final tank inspection report for Tank 201.
  • 2001 to 2006 – Allied used Tank 201 for liquid fertilizer storage.
  • October 2006 – Allied contracted G&T to modify Tank 201 by replacing the vertical riveted joints with butt-welded joints.
  • January 3, 2007 – While G&T was modifying Tank 201, HMT performed an API 653 Out-of-Service inspection of the tank and calculated its safe fill height as 25.65 feet.
  • September 18, 2007 – HMT specified a revised safe fill height of 27.01 feet for Tank 201 based on an April 2001 metallurgical test report provided by Allied.
  • January 18, 2008 – Allied conducted a tank strength test using liquid fertilizer, filling Tank 201 to a final height of 22 feet, 3 and 11/16 inches, or 22.31 feet.
  • January 2008 to November 2008 – Tank 201 was in service holding liquid fertilizer.
  • November 11, 2008 – Allied began filling Tank 201 with liquid fertilizer to find and repair rivet weeps in preparation for painting the exterior of the tank.
  • November 12, 2008, about 2:00 pm – Allied continued filling the tank to a level between 26 and 27 feet, and a welder and helper from G&T began sealing weeping rivets.
  • November 12, 2008, about 2:20 pm – As the tank reached a level of 26.72 feet, a vertical split started midway up the shell and rapidly extended to the floor and roof of the tank on the side opposite the workers.
  • The tank shell separated from the bottom and roof, rapidly releasing the tank’s contents.
  • Employees from a neighboring business witnessed the accident and quickly extricated the workers.
  • The liquid fertilizer overtopped the secondary containment, damaged a facility maintenance building, and flooded portions of the facility and the South Hill neighborhood.
  • The City of Chesapeake Fire Department ordered residents to evacuate for several days.
  • Weeks later, residents again had to leave their homes while an environmental cleanup firm repaired the damage to their property.
  • On December 8, 2008, the CSB made urgent safety recommendations to Allied regarding Tanks 202, 205, and 209.
  • On December 22, 2008, the City of Chesapeake found Tank 209 to be an imminent danger, condemned the tank, and ordered Allied to drain it within 30 days.

Facility and Process Context

  • Allied Terminals, Inc. is a subsidiary of Allied Marine Industries, Inc.
  • Allied is a small, privately-owned chemical storage company based in Norfolk, Virginia, that operates liquid terminals in Norfolk and Chesapeake, Virginia.
  • The Chesapeake marine terminal is adjacent to the southern branch of the Elizabeth River and provides contract storage and distribution of petroleum products and liquid fertilizers.
  • The terminal receives product by ship and pipeline and distributes by barge, rail, and truck.
  • The property north of Banks Street contained 10 fertilizer storage tanks, including Tank 201.
  • The Elizabeth River flows through the Cities of Norfolk, Chesapeake, and Portsmouth, Virginia.
  • Many liquid storage terminals, including all of the large liquid fertilizer storage tanks in Virginia, are located along the Elizabeth River.

Consequences

  • Fatalities: None reported.
  • Injuries: Two workers sustained serious injuries. Two members of the public who tried to aid the injured men required treatment likely related to exposure to ammonia vapor.
  • Environmental release: At least 200,000 gallons of liquid fertilizer were not recovered. Some entered the southern branch of the Elizabeth River.
  • Facility damage: The liquid fertilizer overtopped the secondary containment, damaged a facility maintenance building, and flooded portions of the facility. A two-million-gallon liquid fertilizer storage tank collapsed.
  • Operational impact: Rosemont Avenue was flooded, blocking egress for more than 100 employees at the adjacent business. The City of Chesapeake Fire Department ordered residents to evacuate for several days. Weeks later residents again had to leave their homes while an environmental cleanup firm repaired the damage.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • Allied did not ensure that welds on the plates to replace the vertical riveted joints met generally accepted industry quality standards for tank fabrication.
  • Allied had not performed post-welding inspection, including spot radiography, required for the calculated maximum liquid level for the tank.
  • Allied had no safety procedures or policies for work on or around tanks that were being filled for the first time following major modifications and directed contractors to seal leaking rivets while Tank 201 was being filled to the calculated maximum liquid level for the first time.

Contributing Factors

  • The welds did not penetrate the full thickness of the plates.
  • The welds contained defects, including porosity and undercut, that significantly degraded the strength of the welds.
  • HMT calculated a maximum liquid level for Tank 201 using the requirements for weld joints that are spot radiographed.
  • HMT calculated a maximum liquid level for Tank 201 based on an average wall thickness in lieu of a minimum wall thickness.
  • Allied did not use an authorized inspector or an engineer experienced in storage tank design to approve the modifications to Tank 201.
  • G&T did not use qualified weld procedures or welders to perform the modification in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI: Welding and Brazing Qualification.
  • Allied did not require or perform spot radiography on Tank 201.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • Allied was unaware of The Fertilizer Institute recommended inspection guidelines prior to the incident.
  • Allied had no safety procedures or policies for work on or around tanks following construction or major modifications.
  • Allied directed G&T to seal leaking rivets while Tank 201 was being filled to its calculated safe fill height for the first time.
  • HMT’s use of test results from a single sample from each tank was not sufficient to establish the material type for the entire tank.

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • Allied did not ensure spot radiography was performed on Tank 201.
  • The upper courses of Tanks 202 and 209 and the entirety of Tanks 201 and 205 were not radiographed prior to returning these tanks to service.
  • Allied did not have the modifications to Tanks 201, 202, 205, and 209 approved by an authorized inspector or an engineer experienced in storage tank design as required by API 653.
  • Neither Allied nor G&T prepared and qualified a weld procedure in accordance with the requirements.
  • HMT’s use of the average of only 10 thickness measurements resulted in a higher than allowed maximum liquid level for Tank 201.
  • Had the welds been radiographed as required by API 653, these weld defects would most likely have been detected and should have been repaired.

Recommendations

  1. 2009-03-I-VA-R4 | Recipient: United States Environmental Protection Agency | Status: Not specified | Revise and reissue the Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office Rupture Hazard from Liquid Storage Tanks Chemical Safety Alert. At a minimum, revise the alert to include the Allied Terminals tank failure, discuss the increased rupture hazard during first fill or hydrostatic testing, and list The Fertilizer Institute fertilizer tank inspection guidelines in the reference section.
  2. 2009-03-I-VA-R5 | Recipient: Governor and Legislature of the Commonwealth of Virginia | Status: R5: Closed – Acceptable Action | Require state regulation of 100,000-gallon and larger fertilizer storage tanks or authorize local jurisdictions to regulate these tanks. The regulations should address design, construction, maintenance, and inspection of 100,000-gallon and larger liquid fertilizer storage tanks, and incorporate generally recognized and accepted good engineering practice.
  3. 2009-03-I-VA-R6 | Recipient: Kinder-Morgan Liquid Terminals, LLC formerly Allied Terminals, Inc. | Status: Closed – Acceptable Action | Hire a qualified independent reviewer to verify that maximum liquid levels for all tanks at Allied’s Norfolk and Chesapeake terminals meet the requirements of American Petroleum Institute Standard 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction. At a minimum, the review should verify that all requirements for welding, inspection of welds, and In-Service and Out-of-Service tank inspections are met. Make the complete review report for both terminals available to the Cities of Norfolk, Chesapeake, and Portsmouth, Virginia, as well as the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality.
  4. 2009-03-I-VA-R7 | Recipient: Kinder-Morgan Terminals LLC (K-M) formerly Allied Terminals, Inc. (ATI) | Status: Closed – Acceptable Action | Develop and implement worker safety procedures for initial filling of tanks following major modification or change-in-service. At a minimum, require the exclusion of all personnel from secondary containment during the initial filling.
  5. 2009-03-I-VA-R8 | Recipient: HMT Inspection, Inc. | Status: Not specified | Implement The Fertilizer Institute’s inspection guidelines as part of tank inspector training and inspection procedures for fertilizer tank inspection.
  6. 2009-03-I-VA-R9 | Recipient: HMT Inspection, Inc. | Status: Not specified | Revise company procedures to require tank inspectors to verify that radiography required as part of the calculation for a maximum liquid level has been performed.
  7. 2009-03-I-VA-R10 | Recipient: The Fertilizer Institute | Status: Not specified | Formally recommend to all member companies the incorporation of The Fertilizer Institute tank inspection guidelines into contracts for the storage of liquid fertilizer at terminals.
  8. 2009-3-I-VA-UR1 | Recipient: Allied Terminals, Inc. | Status: Closed – No Longer Applicable | Take immediate action to reduce the risk of a catastrophic failure of Tanks 202, 205, and 209 at the Allied Terminals Hill Street facility including but not limited to significantly reducing the maximum liquid levels (“safe fill height”) based on sound engineering principles. Report the actions taken to the City of Chesapeake.
  9. 2009-3-I-VA-UR2 | Recipient: Allied Terminals, Inc. | Status: Closed – No Longer Applicable | Select and retain a qualified, independent tank engineering firm to evaluate Tanks 202, 205, and 209 and determine their fitness for continued service. The evaluation should be based on recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, such as API 653 - Tank Inspection, Repair Alteration, and Reconstruction and API 579 - Fitness for Service.
  10. 2009-3-I-VA-UR3 | Recipient: Allied Terminals, Inc. | Status: Closed – No Longer Applicable | Within 30 days, provide the report prepared by the independent tank engineering firm to the City of Chesapeake, together with a comprehensive action plan and schedule to address any identified deficiencies.

Key Engineering Lessons

  • For modified storage tanks, weld quality must meet generally accepted industry standards and be verified by the required post-welding inspection before the tank is returned to service.
  • Maximum liquid level calculations must be based on appropriate tank data and the inspection assumptions required by the governing standard.
  • First fill after major modification requires specific safety procedures, including keeping personnel out of secondary containment during initial filling.
  • Tank modifications should be approved by an authorized inspector or an engineer experienced in storage tank design as required by API 653.

Source Notes

  • Priority 1 final report used to resolve conflicts and establish the authoritative incident narrative.
  • Priority 4 recommendation status pages were used only for recommendation status updates and later disposition of related tanks.
  • All facts were taken only from the provided extracts. No external information was added.

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