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Third Coast Industries Petroleum Products Facility Fire

Overview

On May 1, 2002, a fire erupted at the Third Coast Industries petroleum products facility in unincorporated Brazoria County, Texas. The facility blended and packaged motor oils and other automotive products. Firefighters arrived within minutes but had insufficient means to fight the fire. The fire burned for more than 24 hours and consumed 1.2 million gallons of combustible and flammable liquids. The site was destroyed. Nearby residents were evacuated. A local school was closed. Significant environmental cleanup was required. No employees or firefighters were injured. The initiating event could not be determined.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company Third Coast Industries
Location Brazoria County, TX
Incident Date 05/01/2002
Investigation Status The final report on this investigation was approved on March 6, 2003.
Accident Type Chemical Distribution - Fire and Explosion
Final Report Release Date 03/06/2003

What Happened

  • At approximately 1:00 am on May 1, 2002, a fire erupted at the Third Coast Industries blending and packaging facility in an unincorporated area of Brazoria County, near Friendswood and Pearland, Texas.
  • On the evening of April 30, 2002, 12 Third Coast employees worked an evening shift.
  • At approximately 11:30 pm, workers in warehouse 1 left the site after packaging motor, hydraulic, and gear oils into quart containers and 5-gallon pails.
  • At 1:05 am on the morning of May 1, the Third Coast contract security guard arrived at the facility.
  • At approximately 1:20 am, the guard observed a fire in front (east) of warehouse 1.
  • The guard stated that the fire appeared to be located outdoors on a worktable at packaging line 4. The table was used for labeling and package closing.
  • The guard called 911 and returned to the door of warehouse 2.
  • At 1:28 am, the first emergency responder, the chief of the Pearland VFD, arrived on scene.
  • The chief observed a ground level pool fire, 65 to 80 feet in width, to the east of warehouse 1.
  • The fire engulfed two box trailers containing empty drums and a 6,000-gallon tank wagon containing a synthetic motor oil that Third Coast was repackaging into smaller containers.
  • The chief called for mutual aid from the Friendswood and Alvin VFDs and requested evacuation of residents of West Clover Lane and the next streets to the east and west of the Third Coast facility.
  • The chief heard two loud explosions from the tank farm area and backed away.
  • Insufficient water was available to fight the fire.
  • A maximum flow of 750 gallons per minute was established through a tanker relay system using three portable dump tanks.
  • Based on the lack of water and the risk of environmental damage due to runoff from contaminated firewater, the decision was made not to attack the fire.
  • As the fire spread into the storage tank area, the liquid pool fire was observed moving from the warehouse 1 area toward the front of the facility.
  • The fire spread to a loaded box trailer and warehouse 2, and also across the southern property line into a neighbor’s garage and machine shop.
  • Over the course of the next several hours, the fire engulfed the entire tank farm and spread through warehouses 2, 3, and 4.
  • The fire was brought under control by midnight, 23 hours after first being reported.
  • The fire departments maintained fire watch and scene control until 12:30 pm on May 2, when they were relieved by a fire control contractor hired by Third Coast.
  • The evacuated residents living on West Clover Lane, closest to the facility, were unable to return to their homes until May 4.
  • In July 2002, Third Coast entered into a Voluntary Cleanup Agreement with TCEQ for remediation of the fire scene.

Facility and Process Context

  • Third Coast Industries was located on West Clover Lane, in an unincorporated section of Brazoria County, near Friendswood and Pearland, Texas, approximately 18 miles southeast of downtown Houston.
  • The company was formed in 1987 and began operations in 1988.
  • At the time of the fire, Third Coast employed 100 people at the Friendswood site.
  • The facility blended and packaged windshield washer fluid; antifreeze; motor oils; hydraulic oils; gear oils; greases; engine and engine part cleaners and solvents; and transmission, brake, and power steering fluids.
  • The facility also did business as a tolling operation, blending and repackaging material for major oil and lubricant companies.
  • Seventy-four storage tanks were in use at the time of the fire.
  • Another 18 storage tanks were installed, but not in use.
  • The tanks were divided among five diked areas.
  • The rudimentary diking generally consisted of two courses of hollow masonry blocks.
  • Four buildings at the Third Coast facility were used for product blending, packaging, and storage: Warehouse 1, Warehouse 2, Warehouse 3, and Warehouse 4.
  • The Third Coast facility contained 11 blending/packaging lines. Eight were located inside warehouse buildings and three were located outdoors under cover.
  • There were three lines for filling drums, each with the capacity to fill 400 drums per shift.
  • Third Coast was more than 1 mile from the closest municipal source of water.
  • The facility had small wells for potable water and for miscellaneous uses.
  • One-inch water hoses were available to extinguish small fires.
  • Several types of fire extinguishers were located throughout the plant site.

Consequences

  • Fatalities: None reported.
  • Injuries: No employees or firefighters were injured during the incident.
  • Environmental release: Significant environmental cleanup was necessary due to fumes and runoff. Contaminated soil (2,420 cubic yards) classified by EPA as nonhazardous industrial waste; soot/ash (10 cubic yards); and trees and debris (50 cubic yards) were removed from the site for disposal. Approximately 900,000 gallons of oily and nonoily liquid waste was also removed from the site.
  • Facility damage: A fire of relatively small magnitude destroyed the entire facility. The fire destroyed the site, several neighboring buildings were destroyed, and on the south side of the facility the fire destroyed both a small building and a small business on adjacent private property.
  • Operational impact: One hundred nearby residents were evacuated, a local school was closed, and the fire burned for more than 24 hours. The evacuated residents living on West Clover Lane were unable to return to their homes until May 4. Third Coast announced that it will not rebuild at this site.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • The CSB and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms were unable to determine the fire’s initiating event.
  • BATF ruled that the cause of the fire was “undetermined,” meaning that it could not conclusively state whether the fire was accidental or deliberately set.
  • CSB identified possible initiating events: flammable or combustible liquids contacting hot surfaces; spontaneous combustion of solvent-soaked rags; electrical fire; arson or vandalism.

Contributing Factors

  • Rupture of drums of combustible liquid at packaging line 4, outside warehouse.
  • Failure of blend tanks.
  • Failure of combustible liquid tank wagon.
  • The Third Coast facility lacked adequate drainage or containment to prevent liquids released from the drums, blend tanks, and tank wagon from flowing toward the rest of the facility or offsite.
  • The dike wall on the south side of the tank farm was composed of two courses of hollow cinderblock. The cinderblock was broken in places and mortared joints were cracked.
  • The storage tanks were located within 1 foot of the dike wall.
  • The warehouse walls at Third Coast were constructed of corrugated metal.
  • The warehouse walls would have lasted only 15 to 30 minutes before failing.
  • The Third Coast facility did not have automatic fire or heat detectors in operating or warehouse areas.
  • The Third Coast facility had no manual or automatic suppression systems.
  • The Third Coast facility had insufficient onsite fire water.
  • The tank wagon was located within 6 feet of packaging line 4.
  • The tank wagon and several blend tanks were located very close to the operating areas of warehouse 1.
  • The site had inadequate drainage and curbing in the location of the packaging line, tank wagon, and blend tanks at warehouse 1.
  • Storage tanks were inadequately designed and sited.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • Brazoria County had no laws or regulations that required Third Coast to comply with established fire codes.
  • Third Coast did not conduct an adequate fire protection analysis.
  • Third Coast did not have a management system in place to identify or analyze serious fire hazards that could affect the plant, its employees, the surrounding community, or the environment.
  • There is no evidence that Third Coast or its insurance company conducted formal fire protection analyses, consulted fire protection experts, or reviewed best practice publications, such as those of FM and IRI.
  • Third Coast was not legally obligated to comply with NFPA 30.
  • Third Coast Industries was not obligated by State or County regulations to abide by NFPA 30 or any other fire code.
  • In Texas, fire and building codes are not enforced on a statewide basis.
  • It is the responsibility of municipalities and counties to both adopt and enforce fire and building codes.
  • Brazoria County has not adopted a fire code.
  • The Third Coast facility was not required to comply with fire codes.

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • An onsite water supply for both manual and automatic fire suppression was not in place.
  • Fire detection equipment was absent.
  • Improved drainage and containment of large liquid spills were not in place.
  • The facility did not have automatic fire or heat detectors in operating or warehouse areas.
  • The facility did not have manual or automatic suppression systems.
  • Smoke/fire detection equipment or alarms were absent.
  • The drums at packaging line 4 were not equipped with drum relief devices.
  • The storage tanks did not have relief devices suitable for external fire scenarios.
  • The warehouse buildings were not constructed to minimize the spread of fire.
  • Warehouse buildings were not built as 2-hour firewalls.
  • The facility had inadequate containment or drainage to control the spread of burning liquid pools.
  • The facility had no source of water for manual or automatic fire suppression.
  • The facility had inadequate drainage and curbing in the location of the packaging line, tank wagon, and blend tanks at warehouse 1.
  • The facility lacked adequate control measures to limit the spread of the initial fire.
  • The facility lacked adequate control measures to contain or control fires that could reasonably be expected to occur.
  • The facility had an inadequate system of fire suppression to control the small initial fire or to stop the fire from spreading.

Recommendations

  1. 2002-03-I-TX-R1 | Recipient: Third Coast Terminals | Status: Not specified | Audit the Third Coast Terminals facility in Pearland, Texas, in light of the findings of this report. Take action to ensure that the facility’s fire suppression and control procedures meet the relevant requirements of NFPA 30 and OSHA 1910.106.
  2. 2002-03-I-TX-R2 | Recipient: National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) | Status: Closed – Acceptable Alternative Action | Revise NFPA 30, the Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, to address the following issues: For facilities that are not staffed around the clock, specify circumstances where automatic fire detection is needed; Narrow exemptions for Class IIIB liquids; Expand fire protection analysis requirements to include all areas of a facility where there may be flammable or combustible fire risks.
  3. 2002-03-I-TX-R3 | Recipient: International Code Council (ICC) | Status: Closed – Unacceptable Action/No Response Received | Revise the International Fire Code to address the following issues: For facilities that are not staffed around the clock, specify circumstances where automatic fire detection is needed; Narrow exemptions for Class IIIB liquids; Expand fire protection analysis requirements to include all areas of a facility where there may be flammable or combustible fire risks.
  4. 2002-03-I-TX-R4 | Recipient: County of Brazoria, Texas | Status: Not specified | Adopt a fire code, such as the NFPA Uniform Fire Code or the ICC International Fire Code, for application in unincorporated areas.
  5. 2002-03-I-TX-R5 | Recipient: Petroleum Packaging Council (PPC) | Status: Not specified |
  6. 2002-03-I-TX-R6 | Recipient: Independent Lubricant Manufacturers Association (ILMA) | Status: Not specified |
  7. 2002-03-I-TX-R7 | Recipient: American Petroleum Institute (API) | Status: Not specified |
  8. 2002-03-I-TX-R8 | Recipient: National Association of Chemical Distributors (NACD) | Status: Not specified |
  9. 2002-03-I-TX-R9 | Recipient: National Association of Counties (NACo) | Status: Not specified |
  10. 2002-03-I-TX-R10 | Recipient: International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) | Status: Not specified |
  11. 2002-03-I-TX-R11 | Recipient: National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC) | Status: Not specified |
  12. 2002-03-I-TX-R12 | Recipient: Risk and Insurance Management Society (RIMS) | Status: Not specified |
  13. 2002-03-I-TX-R13 | Recipient: National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) | Status: Not specified |

Key Engineering Lessons

  • Facilities storing and repackaging combustible and flammable liquids need adequate drainage and containment so burning liquids cannot spread through the site or offsite.
  • Automatic fire or heat detection is critical where facilities are not staffed around the clock and where an initial fire may grow before discovery.
  • Onsite water supply and manual or automatic suppression capability are necessary to control a small initial fire before it becomes a total-loss event.
  • Warehouse construction and separation should limit fire spread. Corrugated metal walls and closely spaced buildings and tanks provided little resistance to fire propagation.
  • Storage tanks, tank wagons, and drums need fire protection features suitable for external fire scenarios, including relief devices and appropriate siting.
  • A formal fire protection analysis is needed to identify serious fire hazards affecting the plant, surrounding community, and environment.

Source Notes

  • Priority 1 final report used as the primary authority for incident facts and findings.
  • Priority 3 recommendation status summaries used to update recommendation statuses for R2 and R3.
  • Priority 4 supporting documents were used only where consistent with the final report and to supplement context. Conflicts were resolved in favor of the final report.
  • The final report states the initiating event was undetermined. Possible initiating events are listed as identified by CSB, but not as confirmed causes.

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