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Bethune Point Wastewater Plant Explosion

Overview

On January 11, 2006, two municipal workers died and another was seriously injured at the Bethune Point Wastewater Treatment Plant in Daytona Beach, Florida. The incident occurred while workers were removing a steel canopy or roof above a methanol storage tank. Cutting torch sparks ignited methanol vapors from the tank vent. The flame flashed back into the tank. An explosion and fire released tank contents and caused major damage. The CSB final report identified deficiencies in hot work control, hazard communication, flame arrester maintenance, and public employee safety coverage.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company City of Daytona Beach
Location Daytona Beach, FL
Incident Date 01/11/2006
Investigation Status CSB final report issued March 13, 2007; later recommendation status changes documented, including some closed with unacceptable action or acceptable action.
Accident Type Flammable Vapor Investigation
Final Report Release Date 03/13/2007

What Happened

  • On January 11, 2006, three city workers were removing a hurricane-damaged steel roof or canopy above a methanol storage tank at the Bethune Point Wastewater Treatment Plant.
  • Two workers were using a cutting torch or oxyacetylene torch while a third worker operated a crane to lower roof sections.
  • Sparks and flames from the torch ignited methanol vapors coming from the tank vent.
  • The flame flashed back through the flame arrester and into the storage tank, causing an explosion inside the tank.
  • The explosion and subsequent fire caused methanol piping failures and a large fire that engulfed the tank and workers.
  • Two workers were killed and one worker was seriously or critically injured.
  • Firefighters extinguished the fire later that afternoon.
  • The CSB issued its final report on March 13, 2007.

Facility and Process Context

  • Bethune Point Wastewater Treatment Plant in Daytona Beach, Florida.
  • The plant processes wastewater using a treatment process that requires the addition of methanol.
  • The methanol system included a 10,000-gallon carbon steel storage tank used for sporadic methanol addition after the process was modified in 1999.
  • The methanol system was designed by Camp Dresser & McKee Inc. and is also referenced as Camp, Dresser and McKee.
  • The work involved repairing or removing a metal roof or canopy over the methanol storage tank.

Consequences

  • Fatalities: 2
  • Injuries: 1 seriously injured or critically injured; 14 people sought medical evaluation
  • Environmental release: Approximately 3,000 gallons of methanol were released from the tank.
  • Facility damage: Explosion and fire. The tank was permanently deformed, the bottom rounded, the side wall raised, the flame arrester was blown off, a level sensor was blown off, pipes and valves were separated from flanges, and the tank fill and outlet pipes were damaged.
  • Operational impact: Fire engulfed the tank and workers. Firefighters extinguished the fire later that afternoon. No off-site consequences were reported.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • Flames or sparks from the cutting torch ignited flammable methanol vapors coming from the tank vent.
  • The flame flashed back into the storage tank, causing an explosion inside the tank.
  • The badly corroded flame arrester failed to function and did not prevent flame propagation into the tank.

Contributing Factors

  • The flame arrester was made of aluminum even though methanol corrodes aluminum.
  • The flame arrester was not cleaned or inspected since its installation in 1993.
  • The operation and maintenance manual did not include a requirement to maintain the flame arrester.
  • The piping and valves in the methanol system were constructed of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) or thermoplastics in lieu of steel.
  • The City had no program to evaluate the safety of non-routine tasks.
  • The City had not implemented a systematic method for identifying hazards during non-routine work.
  • The City had no permit-to-work system or no effective permit system for hot work.
  • The City had no program, written or otherwise, to control hot work at city facilities.
  • The scope, content, and frequency of HAZCOM / Right-to-Know training did not adequately prepare employees for methanol hazards.
  • There was no evidence that workers received methanol hazard training in the last 10 years, and no evidence they were trained on the flammable and explosive hazards of methanol.
  • The City eliminated its only safety position in 2004.
  • Florida law did not mandate equivalent protections for public employees.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • The City of Daytona Beach did not implement adequate controls for hot work at the Bethune Point WWTP.
  • The City of Daytona Beach had an ineffective HAZCOM program.
  • The City of Daytona Beach had no systematic program to evaluate the safety of non-routine tasks.
  • The City of Daytona Beach had no program, written or otherwise, to control hot work at city facilities.
  • The City of Daytona Beach did not require work plan reviews to evaluate the safety of non-routine tasks.
  • No Florida state laws or regulations existed to require municipalities to implement safe work practices or communicate chemical hazards to municipal employees.
  • Florida municipalities were not covered by OSHA workplace safety standards.
  • No state or federal oversight of public employee safety existed in the State of Florida.
  • The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 does not cover public employees.
  • Florida had a non-federally approved public employee program and right-to-know law until 2000, when the programs were eliminated.
  • The Governor's executive order directed only certain state agencies to voluntarily comply with a limited set of OSHA standards and did not cover cities and counties.
  • There appears to be a gap in workplace safety coverage for state municipal workers in Florida.

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • hazard communication (HAZCOM) program
  • Right-to-Know / Hazard Communication Training Program
  • hot work controls
  • permit-to-work system
  • work plan reviews to evaluate the safety of non-routine tasks
  • flame arrester
  • flame arrester maintenance and inspection
  • operation and maintenance manual requirement to maintain the flame arrester
  • use of steel piping and valves where required by NFPA 30
  • OSHA 1910.106 compliance for aboveground piping containing flammable liquids
  • NFPA 30 compliance
  • safety position at the City of Daytona Beach

Recommendations

  1. 2006-03-I-FL-R1 — Recipient: Governor and Legislature of Florida — Status: Closed-Unacceptable Action — Enact legislation requiring state agencies and each political subdivision of Florida to implement policies, practices, and procedures, including chemical hazards, covering the workplace health and safety of Florida public employees that are at least as effective as OSHA. Establish and fund a mechanism to ensure compliance with these standards. Consider legislation providing coverage of Florida public employees under an occupational safety and health program in accordance with Section 18(b) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and 29 CFR 1956.1.
  2. 2006-03-I-FL-R2 — Recipient: Governor and Legislature of Florida — Status: Closed-Unacceptable Action — Develop and fund a workplace safety and health consultation program for Florida public employees similar to the private sector program currently administered by the Florida Safety Consultation Program at the University of South Florida.
  3. 2006-03-I-FL-R3 — Recipient: City of Daytona Beach — Status: Not specified — Adopt city ordinances to require departments to implement policies, practices, and procedures concerning safety and health in the workplace for city employees that are at least as effective as relevant OSHA standards. Emphasize compliance with chemical standards, including hot work procedures and chemical hazard communication. Implement procedures to ensure compliance with these policies, practices, and procedures.
  4. 2006-03-I-FL-R4 — Recipient: City of Daytona Beach — Status: Not specified — Ensure that flammable liquid storage tanks used throughout the city comply with NFPA 30 and minimum federal standards in 29 CFR 1910.106, including appropriate piping and flame arresters.
  5. 2006-03-I-FL-R5 — Recipient: National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) — Status: Closed – Acceptable Alternative Action — Revise NFPA 30 to specifically exclude the use of thermoplastics in aboveground flammable liquid service.
  6. 2006-03-I-FL-R6 — Recipient: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) — Status: Closed – Reconsidered/Superseded — Revise OSHA 29 CFR 1910.106 to specifically exclude the use of thermoplastics in aboveground flammable liquid service.
  7. 2006-03-I-FL-R7 — Recipient: Water Environment Federation (WEF) — Status: Closed – Acceptable Action — Work with the Methanol Institute to prepare and distribute a technical bulletin containing information on the safe receipt, storage, use, and dispensing of methanol in wastewater treatment plants. Include information on basic fire and explosion prevention measures when using bulk methanol, including flame arrester maintenance, hot work programs, and electrical classification.
  8. 2006-03-I-FL-R8 — Recipient: U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration — Status: Not specified — Work with the Methanol Institute to prepare safety training materials for wastewater treatment facilities that use methanol.
  9. 2006-03-I-FL-R9 — Recipient: Methanol Institute — Status: Not specified — Work with the Water Environment Federation to prepare and distribute a technical bulletin containing information on the safe receipt, storage, use, and dispensing of methanol in wastewater treatment plants. Include information on basic fire and explosion prevention measures when using bulk methanol, including flame arrester maintenance, hot work programs, and electrical classification.
  10. 2006-03-I-FL-R10 — Recipient: Methanol Institute — Status: Not specified — Work with the Water Environment Federation to prepare safety training materials for wastewater treatment facilities that use methanol.
  11. 2006-03-I-FL-R11 — Recipient: Camp Dresser & McKee Inc — Status: Not specified — Revise CDM policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate quality control measures are applied so that designs specify appropriate materials and comply with applicable safety standards. Ensure that wastewater treatment plant design engineers are aware of the importance of proper material selection as well as the findings and recommendations of this report.
  12. 2006-03-I-FL-R12 — Recipient: Camp Dresser & McKee Inc — Status: Not specified — Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to all companies that contracted with CDM for methanol and other flammable liquid systems that were constructed with aboveground plastic pipe. Recommend replacing plastic pipe with an appropriate material in accordance with NFPA 30 and OSHA 1910.106.
  13. 2006-03-I-FL-R13 — Recipient: Camp Dresser & McKee Inc — Status: Not specified — Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to all companies that contracted with CDM for flammable liquid systems that included a flame arrester. Emphasize the importance of periodic maintenance of the flame arrester to ensure its effective performance.

Key Engineering Lessons

  • Hot work above or near a flammable liquid storage tank requires effective controls to prevent ignition of vented vapors.
  • Flame arresters must be made of suitable materials and maintained and inspected so they can function as intended.
  • Material selection for aboveground flammable liquid service should comply with applicable standards. Thermoplastics and PVC were identified as inappropriate in this case.
  • Non-routine work needs a systematic hazard review and permit-to-work or equivalent control before work begins.
  • Hazard communication and task-specific training must address the actual flammable and explosive hazards present in the workplace.

Source Notes

  • Priority 1 final report content was not provided. Consolidation is based on the supplied CSB final report text and supporting documents.
  • Where documents differed, the higher-priority final report and recommendation status pages were used to resolve recommendation status and technical details.
  • Official terminology such as HAZCOM, flame arrester, hot work, and NFPA 30 / OSHA 29 CFR 1910.106 was preserved from the source documents.

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