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EQ Hazardous Waste Plant Explosions and Fire

Overview

On October 5, 2006, a fire and subsequent explosions occurred at the EQ hazardous waste facility in Apex, North Carolina. The incident led to a precautionary evacuation of thousands of residents for two days. The incident likely began in the oxidizer section of the facility, where unspent aircraft oxygen generators and solid chlorine-based pool chemicals were stored. The fire spread rapidly to flammable hazardous waste storage, the hazardous waste building collapsed, and the facility was destroyed. About 30 people sought medical attention. The CSB issued recommendations addressing emergency planning, fire protection standards, and hazardous waste handling guidance.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company Environmental Quality Company (EQ)
Location Apex, NC
Incident Date 10/05/2006
Investigation Status The CSB's final report was issued at a news conference on April 16, 2008.
Accident Type Explosions and fire at a hazardous waste facility forced the evacuation of approximately 16,000 residents from Apex, North Carolina.
Final Report Release Date 04/16/2008

What Happened

  • At 9:38 pm on October 5, 2006, a citizen driving past the EQ facility called 911 to report a haze with a “strong chlorine smell.”
  • The Apex 911 center dispatched emergency personnel to investigate.
  • Responding Apex Fire Department personnel discovered a chemical cloud coming from one of several businesses on Investment Boulevard.
  • The Apex Fire Chief, acting as the Incident Commander (IC), sent two firefighter reconnaissance teams in personal protective equipment to investigate the source of the cloud.
  • Firefighters located a small “sofa-size” fire in one of the hazardous waste bays at the EQ facility.
  • Within minutes, the fire spread to the flammable liquid storage area, causing 55-gallon drums of flammable hazardous waste to explode and sending fireballs hundreds of feet into the air.
  • The hazardous waste building ultimately collapsed.
  • The IC chose to take only defensive actions.
  • The defensive actions included ordering a precautionary evacuation of thousands of residents in the surrounding community, controlling access on roads leading into the evacuation area, stopping rail traffic through the community, and closing the air space over the facility.
  • EQ contracted an industrial firefighting and environmental cleanup company with specialized equipment to extinguish the fire and clean up the site.
  • The contractor built sand berms to minimize water runoff, removed the roof and structural steel to access the burning waste, extinguished the fire with foam, and removed all debris and hazardous waste from the site.
  • The evacuation area included about 3,300 residences, the town hall, a fire station, and the town 911 center.
  • Officials established an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) outside of the evacuation area.
  • The IC continued the evacuation order for two days because of potential re-ignition and persistent smoke from the smoldering rubble.
  • In the early morning of October 6, 2006, the NCDENR and the EPA began air monitoring within the evacuation area.
  • The EPA conducted 10 fly-overs with its ASPECT aircraft.
  • EQ also contracted with a company specializing in environmental monitoring, testing and assessment to conduct ground level atmospheric monitoring beginning October 6, 2006.
  • In the weeks following the incident, the NCDENR conducted soil, indoor environmental, and exterior swipe sampling.
  • On November 17, 2006, the NCDENR reported that “environmental tests show no offsite contamination from EQ fire.”

Facility and Process Context

  • Environmental Quality Company (EQ) operated hazardous and non-hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities at 20 locations in the United States.
  • The EQ facility in Apex, North Carolina, known as EQ North Carolina, or EQNC, provided hazardous and non-hazardous waste bulking, solidification, storage, and transfer.
  • Businesses served included research and development facilities, educational institutions, manufacturing companies, government entities, retail stores, and medical facilities.
  • Enviro-Chem Environmental Services, Inc. constructed and operated the Apex hazardous waste facility beginning in 1992.
  • EQ acquired the facility in December 2002 and began operating under the Enviro-Chem Environmental Services, Inc. permit in January 2003.
  • In May 2003, the NCDENR issued EQ a permit to operate the facility.
  • EQNC normally operated Monday through Friday from 7:00 am to 4:00 pm with a staff of 15 EQNC and 12 contract employees.
  • The facility included two buildings: a two-story building with offices, employee change room, chemical laboratory, and non-hazardous waste processing area; and a one-story building for hazardous waste handling.
  • The hazardous materials building had a metal pitched roof, metal walls enclosing opposite ends, and open sides.
  • Inside the building were six bays for handling and storing the hazardous waste.
  • An elevated shipping and receiving dock in the center of the building and six-inch-high by three-foot-wide curbs separated the bays.
  • EQNC designated each bay for a specific waste type to separate incompatible materials.
  • Portable fire extinguishers located on each side of the central dock provided fire protection for the building.
  • A chain-link fence with a padlocked gate secured the facility.
  • Following the October 5, 2006, fire, EQ discontinued operations at the Apex, NC, facility.
  • The North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (NCDENR), Division of Waste Management regulates hazardous waste facilities.

Consequences

  • Fatalities: 0
  • Injuries: About 30 people (including 13 first responders) sought medical attention at local hospitals for respiratory distress and nausea. Some were treated; none was admitted.
  • Environmental release: A chemical cloud was reported; the fire spread to the flammable liquid storage area; 55-gallon drums of flammable hazardous waste exploded; the NCDENR reported that “environmental tests show no offsite contamination from EQ fire.”
  • Facility damage: The hazardous waste building ultimately collapsed and the facility was destroyed.
  • Operational impact: City officials ordered thousands of local residents to evacuate for two days; access roads were controlled, rail traffic was stopped, and the air space over the facility was closed; EQ discontinued operations at the Apex, NC, facility.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • The cause of the initial fire was never determined.

Contributing Factors

  • The initial “sofa-size” fire was in the oxidizer bay where a fiberboard container of unspent aircraft oxygen generators and containers of solid chlorine-based pool chemicals were awaiting final shipment.
  • Because oxygen generators were located at or near the origin of the fire and, when exposed to fire, produce oxygen that significantly increases the intensity of a fire, the CSB concluded that the unspent oxygen generators most likely contributed to the rapid spread of the fire to the adjacent bay where flammable hazardous wastes were stored.
  • The curbs could contain spills within the bays, but would not prevent a fire from spreading from one bay to another.
  • Had EQNC used fire barriers (walls) to separate the segregated waste bays, the fire would likely have been contained within the oxidizer bay.
  • The EQNC hazardous waste building was not required to be equipped with fire or smoke detection sensors nor monitored after hours (nights or weekends).
  • Portable fire extinguishers were the only fire control equipment in the EQNC hazardous waste building.
  • EQNC had not provided any detailed written information on the types, quantities, and location of hazardous materials in the facility to fire personnel or the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC).
  • Since the EQNC facility was unoccupied at the time of the incident, no emergency coordinator was on-site to initiate the facility contingency plan or assess the extent of the release or emergency.
  • EQNC had limited contact with the Apex Fire Department prior to the October 5, 2006 fire.
  • EQNC had not provided the fire department or county emergency agency with written information on the types, quantities, and locations of the hazardous materials in the facility prior to the incident.
  • The regulations do not explicitly state what information must be shared, if the information must be written, or if updates are necessary.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • EQNC had limited contact with the Apex Fire Department prior to the October 5, 2006 fire.
  • EQNC had not provided the fire department or county emergency agency with written information on the types, quantities, and locations of the hazardous materials in the facility prior to the incident.
  • EQ met these requirements simply by having the Apex Fire Chief tour the facility once.
  • The EQNC permit application did not describe “fire control equipment” nor include a justification for not installing it in accordance with 40 CFR 264.32 paragraph (c).
  • Despite hundreds of gallons of flammable liquids and strong oxidizers routinely handled onsite, the EQ facility operated with only portable fire extinguishers.
  • No EPA guidance or industry standard is available to facility owners, permitting agencies, and local fire officials to establish appropriate fire prevention, detection, control, and suppression measures.
  • Although EPA regulations implementing RCRA require companies to familiarize local authorities with the facility, its layout, and its hazards, the regulations do not explicitly state what information must be shared, whether the information should be written, or if updates are necessary.
  • The Community Right-to-Know reporting requirements apply only to facilities required to keep MSDS on their hazardous chemicals in accordance with the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard.
  • OSHA excludes hazardous wastes from the requirements of this standard, including MSDS requirements.

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • The EQNC hazardous waste building was not equipped with fire or smoke detection sensors.
  • The EQNC hazardous waste building was not monitored after hours (nights or weekends).
  • The facility included no automated fire suppression equipment.
  • The facility included no fire barriers.
  • Portable fire extinguishers were the only fire control equipment in the EQNC hazardous waste building.
  • EQNC had not provided any detailed written information on the types, quantities, and location of hazardous materials in the facility to fire personnel or the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC).
  • No emergency coordinator was on-site to initiate the facility contingency plan or assess the extent of the release or emergency.
  • The EQNC permit application did not describe “fire control equipment” nor include a justification for not installing it in accordance with 40 CFR 264.32 paragraph (c).
  • EPA regulations do not require a fire protection professional or local fire officials to review the fire protection measures.
  • The oxygen generators were not expended before shipping.
  • The shipping manifest prepared for MAE by the receiving hazardous waste facility incorrectly characterized the generators as general oxidizer waste and did not use the more accurate characterization of “oxygen generator” which has more restrictive transportation requirements.

Recommendations

  1. 2007-01-I-NC-R1 — Recipient: US Environmental Protection Agency — Status: Open — Summary: Ensure that the emergency response planning required for permitted hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (40 CFR 264.37) includes providing written information to state and local emergency response officials on the type, approximate quantities, and locations of materials within the facility (similar to reporting requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act). Additionally, ensure that permit holders periodically update this information throughout the ten-year permit period.
  2. 2007-01-I-NC-R2 — Recipient: Environmental Technology Council — Status: Open — Summary: Petition the National Fire Protection Association, following the guidelines of their “Codes and Standards Development Process” (http://www.nfpa.org/index.asp), to develop a fire protection standard (occupancy standard) specific to hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. This standard should address fire prevention, detection, control, and suppression requirements.
  3. 2007-01-I-NC-R3 — Recipient: Environmental Technology Council — Status: Open — Summary: Develop standardized guidance for the handling and storage of hazardous waste to reduce the likelihood of releases and fires at hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.
  4. 2007-01-I-NC-UR1 — Recipient: Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc. — Status: Open — Summary: Revise and or develop company procedures and policies to require and ensure that unspent chemical oxygen generators that have exceeded their service life be actuated so that the chemical core is expended before shipping by any transport mode.
  5. 2007-01-I-NC-UR2 — Recipient: Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc. — Status: Open — Summary: Review and revise as necessary company procedures and policies for transporting hazardous waste to ensure that hazardous waste is correctly characterized on the shipping manifest.
  6. 2007-01-I-NC-UR3 — Recipient: Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc. — Status: Open — Summary: Communicate to all of your waste brokers and treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to which unspent oxygen generators were shipped: the hazards associated with unspent chemical oxygen generators and that the incorrect shipping name and UN code was, or might have been used, for unspent chemical oxygen generators shipped from your facility.

Key Engineering Lessons

  • Segregating incompatible wastes with curbs alone does not prevent fire propagation between bays; physical fire barriers would likely have contained the fire within the oxidizer bay.
  • Unspent aircraft oxygen generators located near a fire origin can significantly intensify a fire and contribute to rapid spread.
  • Hazardous waste facilities handling flammable liquids and strong oxidizers need fire prevention, detection, control, and suppression measures beyond portable fire extinguishers.
  • Written, detailed information on hazardous materials and their locations should be provided to state and local emergency response officials before an incident and updated during the permit period.
  • Correct characterization of unspent oxygen generators on shipping documents is necessary because they have more restrictive transportation requirements.

Source Notes

  • Priority 1 final report used as primary authority for incident sequence, consequences, findings, and recommendations.
  • Priority 4 supporting documents were used only to supplement details explicitly stated there and not contradicted by the final report.
  • Where documents differed in wording, official terminology from the final report was preserved when possible.
  • The final report states the cause of the initial fire was never determined.
  • The final report and supporting documents consistently identify the facility as EQ North Carolina (EQNC) / Environmental Quality Company (EQ) in Apex, North Carolina.

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