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Hayes Lemmerz Dust Explosions and Fire

Overview

On October 29, 2003, an aluminum dust explosion and fire occurred at the Hayes Lemmerz International–Huntington, Inc. facility in Huntington, Indiana. The incident killed one employee and injured six others. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board determined that the dust that exploded originated in a scrap re-melting system. The explosion destroyed the dust collection equipment outside the building, damaged equipment inside the building, lifted a portion of the roof above one furnace, and ignited a fire that burned for several hours.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company Hayes Lemmerz International–Huntington, Inc.
Location Huntington, IN
Incident Date 10/29/2003
Investigation Status The Board approved an investigation report on this investigation on September 27, 2005. A news conference was held in Fort Wayne, IN, on October 5, 2005.
Accident Type Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire
Final Report Release Date 09/27/2005

What Happened

  • At about 2:30 pm on October 29, 2003, Hayes maintenance personnel shut down the chip feed system because of a smoldering fire located near furnace 5 inside the duct connecting the fume hood to the fume separator.
  • Employees followed the usual practice by shutting down the dry chip feed and the fume hood draft fan, but not the dust collector draft fan, and allowing the fire to burn itself out.
  • At about 8:20 pm, three Hayes maintenance personnel restarted the dry chip feed system.
  • After the restart, chips fed steadily to the furnace 5 sidewell for about 10 minutes.
  • One employee noticed chips falling out of the spark box in the dust collector duct.
  • A fireball erupted from beneath the furnace fume hood.
  • The fireball expanded, rose upward, and blew open the roof of the building.
  • The dust collector explosion and interior deflagration occurred at the same time or in rapid succession.
  • Employees evacuated the plant after the plant emergency alarm sounded.
  • The fire was contained and extinguished in about 2 hours using Class D fire extinguishers.

Facility and Process Context

  • Hayes Lemmerz International–Huntington, Inc. manufactures cast aluminum alloy wheels.
  • The facility has operated since 1984 and employs about 300 people.
  • The entire facility is housed in a single, 220,000-square-foot steel-frame, steel-clad industrial building.
  • A chip-processing system, provided by Premelt, was installed in 1995 to process scrap aluminum for remelting in one of the facility’s melt furnaces.
  • About three years after installing the chip melt system, Hayes added a dust collection system.
  • The dust collector, drop box, and fan were located outside the building.
  • A fume hood was installed above the sidewell of the furnace to draw smoke out of the building.
  • The facility continued to collect, chip, and dewater scrap aluminum for offsite processing after the incident.

Consequences

  • Fatalities
  • 1 employee died of thermal burn injuries the day after the incident.
  • Injuries
  • 6 injured: 2 employees were burned, one critically; 3 other Hayes employees and 1 contractor received minor injuries.
  • Environmental Release
  • Not reported in the source extract.
  • Facility Damage
  • The dust collector was completely destroyed.
  • The drop box was split open into four large pieces.
  • The roof above furnace 5 and the chip handling system was blown off.
  • The west wall was deflected inward from the impact of drop box fragments.
  • The fume separator exhaust fan housing bulged and the supply duct disconnected.
  • The air compressor room wall panel was blown out and a water line ruptured.
  • The chip system control console was damaged.
  • The dry chip hopper and wet chip hopper inlet target box access doors were bulged.
  • Several trusses needed replacement.
  • Operational Impact
  • Wheel-casting operations were suspended for several days.
  • The plant was in full production one week after the explosion.
  • Hayes decided not to repair the dry chip-processing system and dismantled it soon after the initial phase of the investigation was completed.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • The explosion originated in the dust collector after chips had been feeding to furnace 5 for about 10 minutes.
  • Ignition of the lofted dust occurred in the dust collector.
  • A secondary deflagration of dust accumulated on overhead surfaces caused the pressure wave and fireball that damaged the building roof.

Contributing Factors

  • Employees did not wear flame-retardant clothing when performing routine work near the melt furnace.
  • Housekeeping and maintenance in the chip-processing and dust collector areas were inadequate.
  • Facility personnel received no formal training for operating and maintaining the chip-processing and dust collection systems.
  • Infrequent cleaning of the dust collector filters likely contributed to the size of the explosion outside and the extent of dust collector system and chip system damage.
  • High velocity pneumatic transfer of dry chips resulted in frequent duct leaks caused by erosion.
  • These leaks resulted in accumulations of chips and dust throughout the furnace 5 area.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • Hayes did not perform a review to address why the chip system was releasing excess dust.
  • Hayes did not ensure the proper design of the dust collector system.
  • Hayes did not ensure that the dust collector design and installation followed the guidance in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 651.
  • Hayes had no formal, documented program to investigate and implement corrective action for incidents involving fires in the foundry area, especially those fueled by aluminum dust.
  • Hayes did not use a management-of-change review to ensure the proper design of the dust collector system.
  • Hayes did not ensure that NFPA 651 guidance for dust collector location and explosion protection were applied.
  • Hayes did not implement a formal training program for personnel involved in operating and maintaining the chip-processing system and dust collector system.
  • Hayes did not ensure adequate cleaning and maintenance for the dust collector system.
  • Hayes did not require maintenance personnel, who were potentially exposed to flash fires, to wear flame-retardant work clothing when performing routine activities.

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • Explosion venting in the dust collector and drop box was not adequate for existing conditions.
  • There was no explosion isolation device installed to prevent deflagrations from traveling through ducts back into the foundry building.
  • The dust collector was not separated from the foundry building and personnel by at least 50 feet, as recommended in NFPA 484.
  • The dust collector and drop box were equipped with explosion relief vent panels, but the venting was not sufficient to prevent structural damage to the dust collector caused by the overpressure generated in this incident.
  • The slide valve installed in the 20-inch line outside the building did not provide explosion isolation.
  • The dust collector filter cartridges were loaded up with dust.
  • The dust collector draft fan housing was eroded, which is typically caused by dust leaking through or past the filters.
  • The chip feed duct system had numerous locations where temporary patches were installed or holes wore through the pipes.
  • No formal, written procedure existed for handling duct fires.
  • Previous incidents involving fires and deflagrations in the scrap processing area were not reported by employees, or investigated by management.

Recommendations

  1. 2004-01-I-IN-R1 | Recipient: Hayes Lemmerz International, Huntington, Indiana (Hayes) | Status: Not specified | Develop and implement a means of handling and processing aluminum chips that minimizes the risk of dust explosions.
  2. 2004-01-I-IN-R2 | Recipient: Hayes Lemmerz International, Huntington, Indiana (Hayes) | Status: Not specified | Implement a program to provide regular training for all facility employees on the fire and explosion hazards of aluminum dust.
  3. 2004-01-I-IN-R3 | Recipient: Hayes Lemmerz International, Huntington, Indiana (Hayes) | Status: Not specified | Develop and implement policies and procedures for conducting engineering, hazard, and management of change (MOC) reviews of plant projects and modifications to support systems such as chip processing. In particular, ensure that a hazard analysis is conducted during the design phase, as well as during the engineering and construction phases, and when changes are made to the system.
  4. 2004-01-I-IN-R4 | Recipient: Hayes Lemmerz International, Huntington, Indiana (Hayes) | Status: Not specified | Implement a program to conduct management reviews of incidents and near-miss incidents, including duct fires and dust flashes. Apply this program to all plant areas, including support areas such as chip processing. Address the root causes of the incidents and near-misses and implement and track corrective measures.
  5. 2004-01-I-IN-R5 | Recipient: Hayes Lemmerz International, Huntington, Indiana (Hayes) | Status: Not specified | Develop and implement written operating procedures for chip processing and train all affected employees. Ensure that procedures address maintenance and housekeeping.
  6. 2004-01-I-IN-R6 | Recipient: Hayes-Lemmerz International (HLI) | Status: Not specified | Conduct regular audits of all North American facilities that produce, process, or handle aluminum chips or dust, in light of the findings of this report. Emphasize engineering, hazard, and MOC reviews and compliance with NFPA-484. Ensure that audits are documented and contain findings and recommendations, audit findings are shared with the work force at the facility, and audit recommendations are tracked and implemented.
  7. 2004-01-I-IN-R7 | Recipient: Hayes-Lemmerz International (HLI) | Status: Not specified | Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to the work force at Hayes and other HLI facilities with similar operations.
  8. 2004-01-I-IN-R8 | Recipient: Premelt Systems | Status: Not specified | Communicate the findings and recommendations of this investigation to owners/operators of facilities to which Premelt supplies similar aluminum chip-melting systems. Include in your communication specific information that the chip drying process liberates small particles of aluminum, and that such particles may be explosive.
  9. 2004-01-I-IN-R9 | Recipient: Indiana Occupational Safety and Health Administration | Status: Not specified | Develop and distribute an educational bulletin on the prevention of metal dust explosions.
  10. 2004-01-I-IN-R10 | Recipient: Indiana Department of Homeland Security | Status: Not specified | Provide training for fire inspectors in Indiana jurisdictions on the recognition and prevention of aluminum dust explosion hazards.
  11. 2004-01-I-IN-R11 | Recipient: Fire Protection Research Foundation | Status: Not specified | Conduct research into the feasibility and design of improved explosion protection for aluminum dust collector applications, including explosion venting, isolation and suppression systems. Coordinate this research activity with the Aluminum Association, Inc.
  12. 2004-01-I-IN-R12 | Recipient: Aluminum Association, Inc. | Status: Not specified | Conduct research into the feasibility and design of improved explosion protection for aluminum dust collector applications, including explosion venting, isolation and suppression systems. Coordinate this research activity with the Fire Protection Research Foundation.
  13. 2004-01-I-IN-R13 | Recipient: The Aluminum Association, Inc. | Status: Closed – Acceptable Action | Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your members.
  14. 2004-01-I-IN-R14 | Recipient: Risk Insurance Management Society, Inc. | Status: Not specified | Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your members.
  15. 2004-01-I-IN-R15 | Recipient: North American Die Casting Association | Status: Not specified | Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your members.
  16. 2004-01-I-IN-R16 | Recipient: International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) | Status: Not specified | Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership who work in facilities with similar combustible dust hazards.
  17. 2004-01-I-IN-R17 | Recipient: United Steelworkers of America (USWA) | Status: Not specified | Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership who work in facilities with similar combustible dust hazards.
  18. 2004-01-I-IN-R18 | Recipient: National Association of State Fire Marshals | Status: Not specified | Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership.
  19. 2004-01-I-IN-R19 | Recipient: National Fire Protection Association | Status: Not specified | Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership.
  20. 2004-01-I-IN-R20 | Recipient: International Code Council | Status: Not specified | Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your membership.

Key Engineering Lessons

  • Dust collector explosion venting and isolation must be designed for the actual dust loading and process conditions; the installed venting was not sufficient to prevent structural damage.
  • Explosion isolation is needed to prevent deflagrations from traveling through ducts back into the foundry building; the slide valve did not provide isolation.
  • Dust collector location matters; the report states the dust collector was not separated from the foundry building and personnel by at least 50 feet, as recommended in NFPA 484.
  • Dust accumulation in filter cartridges and eroded ducting indicate loss of control of dust transport and collection, which increased the severity of the event.
  • Written procedures for duct fires and formal training for chip processing and dust collection operations were absent, leaving personnel to rely on an unsafe usual practice.

Source Notes

  • Priority 1 final report used as primary authority for incident facts, causes, safeguards, and recommendations.
  • Priority 4 recommendation status page used only to update recommendation R13 status to Closed – Acceptable Action.
  • All facts are limited to statements explicitly provided in the source extracts.

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