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INDSPEC Chemical Corporation Oleum Release

Overview

Uncontrolled oleum release at the INDSPEC Chemical Corporation resorcinol facility in Petrolia, Pennsylvania. The event occurred on October 11, 2008, during an oleum transfer operation. A process tank overflowed, filled a vent system, and released oleum into a storage building. A sulfuric acid mist formed and spread beyond the facility. Emergency responders evacuated or sheltered in place about 2,500 residents from Petrolia, Bruin, and Fairview.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company INDSPEC Chemical Corporation
Location Petrolia, PA
Incident Date 10/11/2008
Investigation Status The CSB case study was issued on 9.30.2009. On October 11, 2008, a transfer operation overflowed an oleum process tank, filling a vent system and releasing the oleum into a storage building at Indspec Chemical Corporation in Petrolia, Pennsylvania. The release of oleum created a cloud of sulfuric acid mist that filled the building and flowed out into the facility and surrounding community. Plant personnel evacuated the facility, while emergency responders evacuated about 2,500 residents from the towns of Petrolia, Bruin, and Fairview.
Accident Type Release
Final Report Release Date 09/30/2009

What Happened

Just after 3:00 pm on Saturday, October 11, 2008, a tank in the oleum storage building overflowed during a transfer operation.

The operator began pumping oleum to a process tank from vessel 611 using the normal power supply and from vessel 610 using the emergency power supply. When vessel 610 ran empty, the operator began pumping from vessel 612 using the emergency power supply.

At about 2:00 pm, the operator completed soda ash preparation and shut down the soda ash process. He returned to the control room and stopped the vessel 611 oleum transfer pump using the DCS console. The transfer pump connected to the emergency power supply remained on, and oleum transfer from vessel 612 continued.

At 2:13 pm, an alarm beacon indicated a high level in process tank 1502. At 2:18 pm, process tank 1502 reached the high-high level setpoint, activating another alarm beacon.

By 3:12 pm, sulfuric acid mist began escaping near the conservation vent for tank 1502. Around 4:15 pm, employees saw a white mist escaping the oleum storage building doors and notified the shift supervisor.

The shift supervisor suspected an oleum leak in the transfer line and ordered the line blown clean. Security video showed an increase in mist intensity at 4:21 pm. By 4:29 pm, white sulfuric acid mist was visible outside the building.

The shift supervisor then determined that the release was not from the transfer line, declared an emergency, and ordered a facility evacuation. At 4:55 pm, the facility security guard began notifying the hazardous materials response team.

At 4:58 pm, the shift supervisor instructed responders to spray the building with water from two fire monitors to absorb and dilute the mist. An INDSPEC reconnaissance team in Level A PPE entered the building to investigate. Before the team retreated, liquid oleum spilled on them from the top of one of the process tanks.

The team concluded that a transfer pump was running and that oleum from one of the pressure vessels had overfilled the process tanks. At about 7:00 pm, electricians used a remote disconnect switch to de-energize the oleum storage building and stop the pump. Post-incident data showed that vessel 612 emptied by about 5:50 pm.

At about 2:00 am on Sunday, October 12, EPA air monitoring found no trace of vapors from the release. The offsite incident commander then declared the emergency over and allowed residents to return home.

Facility and Process Context

  • The INDSPEC Chemical Corporation resorcinol facility is in Petrolia, Pennsylvania.
  • Koppers Company, Inc. owned and operated the facility until 1988.
  • INDSPEC is an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corporation.
  • The facility produces resorcinol, which is used in the rubber industry as an automobile tire adhesive.
  • Oleum is a raw material used in resorcinol production.
  • The facility is in Petrolia, a borough of about 200 people roughly 40 miles northeast of Pittsburgh.
  • Residences and commercial buildings surround much of the facility.
  • The facility is located at the base of an industrialized valley.
  • The resorcinol process normally operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
  • Operators work in the oleum storage building on weekdays between about 7:00 am and 3:00 pm and on weekends as necessary.
  • The oleum storage building contains three horizontal pressure vessels and two vertical process tanks.
  • The building is near the center of the facility.
  • Operators use air pressure to transfer oleum from railcars into the pressure vessels.
  • Each pressure vessel can hold the contents of two full railcars.
  • Operators then pump oleum from the pressure vessels to either of the process tanks.
  • While the manufacturing process operates, oleum flows continuously from the process tanks to the resorcinol production unit.
  • Three INDSPEC operators perform bulk liquid loading and unloading jobs.
  • One operator works in the oleum storage building and two work throughout the rest of the facility.
  • The three operators work Monday through Friday on day shift and rotate among the three jobs weekly.
  • The oleum storage-building operator unloads oleum, benzene, and soda ash from railcars and prepares a soda ash solution.
  • The operator’s DCS console is in a separate building adjacent to the oleum storage building.
  • The facility may schedule weekend work in advance or call an operator to the plant as necessary.

Consequences

  • Fatalities: 0
  • Injuries: One emergency responder suffered a minor injury due to sulfuric acid inhalation.
  • Environmental release: The oleum release created a cloud of sulfuric acid mist that filled the building and flowed out of the facility into the community.
  • Facility damage: Liquid oleum spilled from the vent system. The storage building filled with a dense mist.
  • Operational impact: Plant personnel evacuated the facility. Community emergency responders ordered the evacuation or shelter-in-place of about 2,500 residents from Petrolia, Bruin, and Fairview. The evacuation order continued until about 2:00 am.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • The transfer pump connected to the emergency power supply remained on, and the transfer of oleum to the process tank from vessel 612 continued.
  • The process tank overflowed.
  • The emergency power supply did not incorporate the safety features of the normal power supply.
  • The automatic shutoff tied to a high-high level switch in the process tanks would not stop a pump powered by the emergency power supply.

Contributing Factors

  • The DCS did not display the status of a transfer pump connected to the emergency power supply. Only the local start/stop switch could stop a pump powered by the emergency supply.
  • The audible alarm in the oleum storage building was out of service.
  • The emergency power supply was not connected to the DCS.
  • The facility did not document the original intent of the emergency power supply in plant drawings or procedures.
  • Operators routinely used the emergency power supply on weekends to transfer oleum from the pressure vessels to the process tanks.
  • Operators received only verbal instructions on using the emergency power supply.
  • The facility never included the use of the emergency power supply in its written operating procedures for transferring oleum to the process tanks.
  • The work practice of using two transfer pumps concurrently was never recorded in written operating procedures.
  • The practice of using two pumps concurrently was normalized.
  • The PHA teams did not identify the emergency power supply as a separate means of creating hazardous situations.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • The facility changed the structure of the emergency power supply from temporary wiring to permanent conduit and did not evaluate the significance of this change.
  • The facility installed the emergency power supply without the same safety devices as the normal power supply.
  • The facility relied on human intervention as a safety measure.
  • The facility began updating the written operating procedures, but the use of the emergency power supply was neither new nor out of date and was not addressed.
  • The facility employed two operators for liquid unloading and storage duties when the emergency power supply was originally installed.
  • The former building supervisor was aware of the practice of using two pumps concurrently.
  • The facility added a third operator to the area in the late 1980s, but experienced operators continued to train new operators on the use of the emergency power supply.
  • The facility never included information on the emergency power supply in piping and instrumentation diagrams and written operating procedures.
  • The quality of PHAs suffers when piping and instrumentation drawings and procedures are not accurate.

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • Level indication on oleum tanks.
  • High level alarm.
  • Operator in attendance.
  • High-high level switch.
  • The high-high level probes on the process tanks do not shut off the transfer pump when the emergency power supply is used.
  • The audible alarm in the oleum storage building was out of service for many months and INDSPEC had no process to regularly test the alarm’s function.
  • The emergency power supply was not connected to the DCS.
  • The emergency power supply did not incorporate the safety features of the normal power supply.
  • The water spray from two fire monitors did not lessen the severity of the acid cloud.
  • The team could not reach the local electrical switch room safely because it was flooded with fire water.

Recommendations

  1. Recommendation ID: Not provided
    Recipient: Not provided
    Status: Not provided
    Summary: No recommendations were listed in the provided extract. The recommendations array retains the schema placeholder.

Key Engineering Lessons

  • All modes of operation should have equally robust safeguards for similar hazards.
  • Temporary changes should be treated as permanent until formally evaluated, documented, and controlled in hazard analyses, procedures, training, and drawings.
  • A safety function tied to one power supply mode may not protect against hazards in another mode unless the design is verified for all operating configurations.
  • Accurate piping and instrumentation diagrams and operating procedures are necessary for effective process hazard analysis and safe operation.

Source Notes

  • Consolidated from the provided final report extract only. Source priority 1 was used as authoritative where applicable.
  • No recommendations were listed in the provided extract, so the recommendations array retains the schema placeholder.

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