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Honeywell Geismar Chlorine and Hydrogen Fluoride Releases

Overview

On January 23, 2023, during restart of the HFC-245fa unit at the Honeywell Geismar facility in Geismar, Louisiana, the reboiler shell catastrophically ruptured. The rupture released hydrogen fluoride (HF), chlorine gas, HFC-245fa, and other process fluids. The CSB final report states the incident was one of three serious HF releases in the 245 unit from October 2021 to June 2024. The report concludes the incidents resulted from ineffective implementation of Honeywell's existing safety management systems.

Incident Snapshot

Field Value
Facility / Company Honeywell Performance Materials and Technologies
Location Geismar, LA
Incident Date 01/23/2023
Investigation Status The CSB's investigation was released 5/27/2025. A heat exchanger rupture resulted in the release of hydrogen fluoride (HF) gas, chlorine gas, and various other process fluids. No injuries occurred. The CSB is investigating a second incident at the facility that occurred on June 7, 2024. There was a release of hydrofluoric acid that seriously injured one worker.
Accident Type Release investigation. A heat exchanger rupture resulted in the release of hydrogen fluoride (HF) gas, chlorine gas, and various other process fluids. No injuries occurred. The CSB is investigating a second incident at the facility that occurred on June 7, 2024. There was a release of hydrofluoric acid that seriously injured one worker.
Final Report Release Date 05/27/2025

What Happened

At 7:03 p.m. on January 23, 2023, Honeywell began restarting the HFC-245fa unit after a utility outage at the site. Operations established feed to the distillation column at 7:16 p.m. At 8:12 p.m., the reboiler shell catastrophically ruptured.

Based on the temperature and pressure in the reboiler at the time of failure, a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) occurred. The contents of the reboiler, the distillation column, and other ancillary equipment were released into the ambient air. The release continued until approximately 9:00 p.m. An all-clear signal was given for the industrial complex at 9:15 p.m.

Facility and Process Context

The Honeywell Performance Materials and Technologies facility is in Geismar, Louisiana. The unit involved in the incident began operating in 2003 and manufactures 1,1,1,3,3-Pentafluoropropane (HFC-245fa).

The HFC-245fa unit contains a distillation column with a kettle-style reboiler. The reboiler shell normally contained a mixture of HF, HFC-245fa, and smaller fractions of various process intermediates. The exchanger tubes normally contained steam as the heating medium.

At the time of the incident, the reboiler tube bundle was constructed of Alloy 825 and the shell was constructed of SA-516 Grade 70 carbon steel. The reboiler was designed according to the 2010 edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1.

The facility was constructed in 1967 by the Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation. As of January 2023, the operation of the Honeywell site involved approximately 300 employees and 300 contractors.

Consequences

  • Fatalities: 0
  • Injuries: No injuries occurred as a result of the release.
  • Environmental release: 871 pounds of HF, 1,684 pounds of chlorine, 1,754 pounds of HFC-245fa, and 220 pounds of various process intermediates were released.
  • Facility damage: Approximately $4 million of property damage resulted from the incident.
  • Operational impact: A complex-wide shelter-in-place was initiated at the facility, local officials closed nearby highways, and the HFC-245fa unit was shut down for approximately 47 days.

Key Findings

Immediate Causes

  • The reboiler shell catastrophically ruptured.
  • The reboiler shell had severely thinned due to HF corrosion of the carbon steel.

Contributing Factors

  • The process conditions in the reboiler shell at the time of the incident were within the normal as-designed safe operating limits of the reboiler.
  • The temperature and pressure in the reboiler shell at the time of the incident were greater than the fluids’ atmospheric boiling points.
  • Honeywell found at least two locations on the shell to be as thin as 0.03 inches, corresponding to a thickness loss of roughly 95 percent.
  • The reboiler shell ruptured into at least nine fragments, which were propelled up to 35 feet away.

Organizational and Systemic Factors

  • Honeywell's ineffective implementation of its safety management systems.
  • Honeywell's systems for mechanical integrity, personnel and organizational change, and capital projects contributed to the incident.
  • Honeywell's incomplete implementation of its organizational resilience policies and procedures also contributed to the incident.
  • Honeywell's MI management systems did not ensure that current, active knowledge of the reboiler's condition, and the urgency with which the shell needed to be replaced, was preserved and communicated to affected stakeholders.
  • Honeywell's MI function was siloed, such that key people, departments, and functions remained unaware of the reboiler's condition prior to the explosion.
  • Honeywell created and approved a capital funding request to replace the reboiler shell but never funded or completed the project.
  • The site inconsistently applied its rating process to the various projects submitted for approval.
  • Honeywell moved the reboiler project to the site's longer term annual capital request, a decision that further delayed the reboiler project.
  • Honeywell's organizational resilience policies were first issued in January 2022, after the 2021 fatal incident had already occurred, and Honeywell never convened a corporate-level crisis management team and therefore never developed or implemented a formal action plan.

Failed Safeguards or Barrier Breakdowns

  • Honeywell personnel recommended that the shell be replaced at the next shutdown opportunity.
  • Management approved the project but did not purchase or install a replacement shell before it failed on January 23, 2023.
  • Honeywell did not purchase the replacement shell for the reboiler after initiating the capital project.
  • Honeywell did not create a deficiency notification in SAP for the reboiler shell condition.
  • No SAP notification was created for the reboiler’s next inspection date.
  • No DMAPS action item was created for the reboiler shell condition.
  • Honeywell did not use its emergency process to replace the reboiler shell.

Recommendations

  1. 2023-02-I-LA-R1 | Recipient: Honeywell International Inc. | Status: Open – Acceptable Response or Alternate Response | Summary: Perform a comprehensive third-party audit of the Geismar facility’s process safety and allied management systems as soon as practicable.
  2. 2023-02-I-LA-R2 | Recipient: Honeywell International Inc. | Status: Open – Acceptable Response or Alternate Response | Summary: Require periodic reporting updates from the Geismar site regarding the closure of the audit findings.
  3. 2023-02-I-LA-R3 | Recipient: Honeywell International Inc. | Status: Open – Acceptable Response or Alternate Response | Summary: Perform a Safer Technologies and Alternatives Analysis (STAA) for the Honeywell Geismar HFC-245fa unit.
  4. 2023-02-I-LA-R4 | Recipient: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) | Status: Open – Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response | Summary: Per the requirements in EPA Rule Procedures for Prioritization of Chemicals for Risk Evaluation Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, initiate prioritization to evaluate whether hydrogen fluoride, including its anhydrous and aqueous acid forms, is a High-Priority Substance for risk evaluation. If it is determined to be a High-Priority Substance, conduct a risk evaluation of hydrogen fluoride to determine whether it presents an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. If it is determined to present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, apply requirements to hydrogen fluoride to the extent necessary to eliminate or significantly mitigate the risk, for example by using a methodology such as the hierarchy of controls.

Key Engineering Lessons

  • Corrosion-driven thinning of carbon steel equipment can progress to catastrophic rupture if remaining life is not acted on before the next shutdown opportunity.
  • Mechanical integrity findings must be preserved, documented, and communicated so that replacement projects retain an active owner and do not lose urgency.
  • Capital project approval alone is not sufficient; the replacement equipment must actually be purchased and installed before the equipment reaches failure.
  • Siloed mechanical integrity information can prevent key stakeholders from understanding the urgency of equipment replacement.

Source Notes

  • Priority 1 final report used as primary authority for incident facts, findings, and recommendations.
  • Priority 4 supporting document used to confirm the event timeline, release quantities, and operational impact.
  • Priority 3 recommendation status summaries used to update recommendation status for R1-R4.
  • The user-provided incident metadata described the event as a heat exchanger rupture; the final report identifies the failed equipment as the reboiler shell within the HFC-245fa unit.

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